Tuar China, ashamed of the ignoble stand she made against Western arms in the two last wars, should make use of her best means to increase the strength of her armaments, may seem but natural; and so Jong as we continue to treat with her on terms of equality, will afford no reasonable ground of complaint. Could China, moreover, waking out of her lethargy, be converted into a really powerful nation, there are few who would not welcome the change; for the helpless dependence of the nation on foreign powers in matters external, is only a reflect tion of its equal helplessness in matters of social and internal economy. Whatever may be the reason, whether it marks a step in advance or a desire to return to the exclusive police; of the past, there is no doubt that the effort is being made to increase the defences of the empire seaward, and to organise such a military system as would ensure respect in future negotintions with foreign powers. The fortification of the entrances to the Peilo, the arsenal and gunpowder factories at Tientsin, the arsenals now in existence at Nanking, Shanghai and Foochow, and projected at Canton, and fleets of gen vessels bearing the flags of the viceroys of Nanking, Foochow and Canton are all more or less indicative of this desire to meet on equal terms the warlike powers of Europe. As we have suggested above, a really strong government in China, powerful enough to restrain its own subjects within and protect its honour abroad, would be a source of satisfaction to those having dealings with China—if it acted on the straightforward and intelligent principles implied by a recognition of political " equality." The natural course of events would lend such a government to make regulations for the conduct of trade, and improvements in the means of communication, which would conduce at the same time to its own stability and to the increase of foreign commerce while it would prevent the diplomatic jealousies sometimes incident to relations with an apparently moribund State. But although the very desire to gain a position amongst nations may in itself be laudable, there is great fear of its abuse; and there are not wanting signs that, through some such phase, the statesmen in power in the China of the present are passing. Proud of what they have accomplished within the last few years, by the aid of a few foreigners who have entered their service, and totally ignorant of the real power andre-sources of the least warlike of European nations, there seems to be abroad amongst them a feeling approaching to haughty defiance. The expressed intention of the British Government to treat on terms of equality with that of Peking, has apparently, by at least some of the higher officials, been taken as an acknowledgement of the growing power of China, With many men, and especially with Orientals, there is always the chance that forbearance will be taken as the index of fear; and as our Government has been unwise enough to forbear where injury had been inflicted, and has without murmuring seen one wrong after another committed and one treaty stipulation after another unfringed, it has practically more or less encouraged this spirit. The successful resistance made by the Taku forts in June 1859, to the front attack of the British fleet, has not been forgotten by this section of the Chinese. What the Taku forts have done once, it is fair to argue they may do again; and we believe there is little doubt that to a force attacking them, as did ours in 1859, in front, they would their present condition form a still more formidable obstacle. Such men are, however, apt to forget that, within the twelve years which have elapsed since that date, we have acquired a very fair topographical knowledge of China, and that there are other roads to Peking, which would not entail the useless exposure of our gunboats te the fire of the Taku forts. So again, the small fleets of gunboats being turned out at the various arsenals, in the minds of such men, assume animportancethey do not in reality possess. Were the whole fleet of the three Viceroys concentrated at any one point, it might require some naval force to keep it in check; distributed along a line of coast of some fifteen hundred miles, the present or prospective naval forces of China are really insignificant if opposed to the naval forces of any power with which China is likely to be brought into hostile contact. There is no doubt that an opportunity might be taken for a sudden raid, at some moment when foreign governments were more than usually neglectful of the defence of their nationals, and that thereby much temporary loss and suffering might ensue; and there is perhaps reason to believe that, to a certain section of the Chinese, such an act would appear as a victory. Treachery of the sort would, however, be so certain to bring down condign' punishment, that it seems improbable any official in high office, however hostile to foreign inno-rations, would advise the attempt. Yet for other practical objects, so far as the armament of the Chinese has gone, it is utterly insufficient. Another and even weaker point in connection with the increased warlike preparations of the Empire, is the fact that they have been all carried out under foreign suprevision. The ordinary Chinese officer has ever a tendency to relapse to antique types; the war regulations of Kanghi are still se recognised system of the country'; and it is only by constant and unremitting attention that, however anxious may be the higher officials, the arsenals are prevented from rapidly lapsing into. manufactories of arms of the most useless and nondescript description. Yet foreigners cannot be expected to remain in the service of the Emperor should he inaugurate an anti-foreign war, and without their presence there is every reason to believe that the mutual jean lousy of Chinese officials would in a short time render nugatory all that has ben done. Arsenals and gunboats are in fact still exotics in China; and though possibly they might, in the beginning, increase the difficulty of a settlement, there is little doubt that, in the long ron, they would prove more dangerous weapons for the Chinese than for their opponents. While, therefore, there is no doubt that a large and influential party in China is desirous of preimitating a contest, and that in view of such an eventuality it is well to be prepared, it is equally certain that such a course would be more disastrous for the Chinese themselves than riy quarrel into which they have iherto entered. From this point of w, the multiplication of missions to Europe, where an opportunity can be afforded of studying the offensive preparations of the great powers, may productive of good, in removing that ignorance of the outside world, which ever lends the vainglorious Chinese to assume a superiority over external nations, The reasoning of an ordinary Chinese may be assumed to be something as below. We have arms, ar-serials, ships, and men; foreign nations lave no more, therefore we must be at least their equal. The comparative efficiency of Chinese and foreign tactics, of Chinese and foreign officers, and of Chinese and foreign appliances, and the fact that for the latter they are dependent on foreign assistance, are facts which are too apt to escape the celestial logician
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.