now seen the Inst of the cooperative policy in China. Tt was judi-ions and well conceived, it has d much both to initiate nnd to consoli. date progress, but at length it us received its death blow by a dexterous movement of one of its principal advocates. The policy was naturally a temporary expedient, an experiment enter= ed upon to produce certain results; and we presamo these results have been attained, IP it ment any! it was an effort to exert a moral prox. sure upon the Chinese Authorities and i Peking Man-catered a new and unfamiliar servi and doubtless the necessity of exam carefully and exhaustively the Chinese view of all questions, has led him to change or at least modify many of his former opinions; and the duties and responsibilities of his now position have naturally awakened in his mind now ideas. Bat, conceding to conscientious conversion all that we, possibly, can, there remnius the broad fact that Mfr. Barlingame, one ofthe ston of the rich vaunted ce-operative policy, in the fee of the discussions which have been going on in China on raised by the intended revision of the treaty, line deliborntel i treaty with the United States Go-ich ignores the whole ques-of revision; andis, beyond the possibility of a doubt, a rot 0 fir as the position of fo concerned. 'The clause on of steamers, railways, do. fu the extreme; because' the very. et that moral pressure is our weapon both of defence and aggression, entirely pro-eludes us from yielding ground which we have already taken up, and in which there is no element of injustio the step is decided! retrogressive, becnuso the best friends of Chinn must look to the opening up of the coun concede the reasonable demands of foreigners, without any recourse to force being needful. The representa tives of the various foreign powers with legations at Poking combined for the fartheraneo of this object, and their united action was henceforth to be lover by means of which conces si were to be abt duced. in perfect accord, and. the first seceder from the compact would necessarily Dung the project to a termi Mr. Burlingame has been the obs ion the ce-operative policy, though If one of its chief founders; and he has now enywever much it may seem 1 ten and we may add an individual, success, will in th Tong run prove Jnged steps that the trea!
States Minister, Mr. Burlingame the guardian of the interests of a nation ious like ourselves, "to wabduo" th "to the useful and the ood,' to persuade them to yield concessions which would enrich and strengthen the empire. In this capacity he fully rocognised the fact that, with every wish to do justice, it is imy blo. to m a without the of at least that is, and must be, the keystone of our relation Wo give uteried policy in dealing with the when ho was a foreign repretative, for seeing beyond possibility ly must this moral pressure be cent exerted to obtain frosh concessions, but thatit cannot be even for a time withdrawn if we are toproservo intact thosorights which we have already acquired. No one saw: more uumistukeably than himself that, to yield entirely to Chinese wishes as to the position of foreigners in the ern Piro, would be to relapse into chaos: and that, therefore, to, leave the nose enurely to themselves in the expectation that they would carry out the treaty stipulations honourably, and with sutisfnction to foreigners would be an unpardonable error. I short, the Chinese were n nation to be humanely and justly treated; bat, as we could not rely upon their good faith, we were bound to keep them under tutelage ton certain extent, and not] abandon them altogether to the misfortunes and wiles of semi-civilization, "But Mr. Burlingame, the Ambassador fo western powers, bus to think that we are abimdouing that
at present to attain which itis ove of over principal shjeate up the question of ers nnd to record thi concerned, it means nothing. By such step Mr. Burlingame may win the favour of the Peking Mandarins; but, he has consented to play the game of the road there is no adopt a policy has dono a grievous, s0 Government, and Jed them into difficulties from which it was the chief aim of the ce-operative policy to delivery them, jows from Japan is of consider.
rest. The Mikado hus attained his majority. The town of Nes-c-gata hias fallen, "Both these events are important, and both are fikely to candace to the advantage of the long ngitntod country. It isn matter of no slight consequence to have at last a reco ized and authoritative ruler at the helm of government. This removes one excuse often urged to justify cord, viz. the presence of a minor on the throne. History proves thnt the fay of ragouts bus been rarely favour. able to the pence and happiness of Kingdoms, and long minorities are almost always disastrous. Japan has formed no exception to the rule, The past disturbances have in many cases arisen from the peculiar position of} the sovereign. For our own part we must continue to regard the Northern Daimios as rebels. They of course have made out a plausible case. They have always professed to believe that the edicts enianating from the Mikato were the suggestions of the great feudatories who surrounded him. Just as in the wars of the Roses, the Yorkists, Note folk, Montague and Warwick regarded the acts of the feeble Henry as inspired by Bxoter, Cliford and the other hostile nobles, ud only read in the edicts of hat pulosliadow of a king the evidences Tancastrian hate and jealousy. So ho Japanese barons of the north have regarded the royal style of the Prince, asa thin cloak which has only imperfectly concented the hereditary antipnthy of their southern rivals. Now, however, the Mikado will be able to speak and ack for himself, and there ig ato many indications of his ability to rule his realm with vigour, The campaign will not probably be carried on during the winter monthe, but the southern party will be vigorous than we expect, if they allow the northerners to-employ the time of comparative inaction in materially strengthening their position.. The loss of Neo-e-gata is a serious blow to the Inter, und their opponents seem inclined to follow it up with energy. Of course much depends on the equip: mont of the troops. Hitherto the Mic Kondo has availed himself of the appliances of modern warfare, and if ho oan obtain for his men efficient weapons of Buropean manafuetre his triumph secure. But this work is terribly cost. ep|ly. Wo all know low rapidly the inpanese "uso up" foreign vessels, Only recently, four of his Majesty's steamers have been lost, If ho' wise, then, he will strive to conquer the prejudice his subjects entertain against the employment of foreigners, and oh. tain the help of European drill sorleants for his land forces, and European engineers for his navy. Officored by ich men even as Colonel Gordon laid hold of in the energoncy of the Taiping trouble, " Japanese army would be very formidable,—Certainly it would sw before it any body of mon that the north could" muster. English and American merelinnts have no compunetion about supplying the rebels with arms, and therefore the revolted Barons may possibly be able to moot the Royalists on an equality, in this respect, The war in Japan, like all such contests, will ultimately resolve itself into n question of money. The treasury which is best filled will win in the and. The party which spends most boos on breach-loaders and iron: clads, will remain masters of the disputed field, "Wo lean to the bolict Uhat we shrill 00 the matter fairly fought out, The discordant olements and too powerful to be hough in the intos ly we may desire came cestly to seo ponce restored, we en not anticipate it Who nation iw in fa slate of confusion, The jenlousios and rancours that have siouldored long and secretly are expending. theraselvot, and_threnton a long war, Quo question of course presents itself, and Unt is, what will be the policy of the Foreign Powers?" Is it time, us Kome writers suggest, for Britain to take Jnpnn in hand as she has tnkon Chinn If we cloot to take this course,
irae is Bastern cit oeo rly we support will, we may rely on shall do well tg, be wary, an the
neod, and deny its when we huve fived it from Tie SOUTH-SEA ISLANDERS, Our renders. may caro to know the fate of the South-son islanders who, it will be remembered, wore brought hero some moths ago by the barque Aunt isle, having been picked up at Kea, pen bent, some two hundred miles North of Papua. They arrived hero in the depth of winter and of course suffered badly from cold; but igront interest was shown in them, and fpuiliciont sum was raised to. provide them with food, clothes and lodging. Anny speculations wore vontared us to their exact nationality; but th wns not clearly nscertainod, us the clearly hoy onl ahh no one heres understood, Thai no Inngungo slive their own,
Frequent uttoranes, however, of a sou resembling " Papuan" toned to 00 neet them with that island, and the neighborhood in which they hnd boon found strengthened the surmise, In the hope, accordingly, of their being sent from Foochow to Sydney, whence the could easily get to Japan, the ving soven—two ind died hero from cold—vero shippod to the for in the Toland Qu joner of ventures on the way
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.