Ir it had been necessary to show the weakness of the Admiralty instruction issued to british Naval Officers in China, immediately after the Yangchow troubles, the present crisis would supply a sufficient argument. The desi; of course, to prevent ind use by the Consuls and by Naval Officers, of the force at their command, to exact reparation for any outrage, without reference to Englund; bat the Admiralty went farther, and worded their despatch so nicely that Commanding Officers may conceive a doubt whether they are justified in landing men under any circumstances whatever. They lay down perfectly clearly, at the outset, that H.M. ships of war are stationed here to protect commerce, to maintain discipline, and, in cases of great emergency, to protect the lives und properties of British subjects, if placed in peril by wanton attacks directed against them, either on the part of local authorities or by un uncontrolled popular movement." But they go on to complicate matters by saying that such interference will only be held justified when it is clearly shown that, without such interference, British lives and property in all probably have been sacrificed; "and even in such case H. M. Government will expect to learn that the alternative of receiving them on hourd ship, and so extricating them from threatened danger, was not available." The reservation might be good, in case of Chinkiang; but even there would be hardly applicable, for property could not be saved in un emergency, although lives might be. The instructions seem in fact to have been penned for the sake of puzzling the whom they are intended to guide, or for the suke of establishing a quibble, in case of question, ut Home. But, applying the case to Shanghai, it would mean that some thousand Englishmen, with a number of women and children, and an enormous quantity of property, are to migrate on board the ships Barrosa and Zebra—which would hardly con-the Englishmen themselves, omit-their household property, overlooking their merchandize, and saying nothing whatever of their houses. It seems useless to enlarge on such ay ubsnrdity, It is only necessary to conceive the time it would take to get such a mass of people and property on board ship, to show how utterly inapplicable the alternative would be, in the case of this large Settlement, Let us imagine, in fact, that the attack on Shanghai, which is in the mouth of every Chinaman, takes place—toreign houses burning, foreigners pursued, and being murdered by, or defending themselves at great "odds against a frantic mob, in sight of the meu-of-war in port. Is it possible to suppose a Naval Officer remaining quietly on board ship, under such circumstances, without firing a shot or lifting a finger in aid of his countrymen? Would not he rather face a handyed courts-martial for disobeying orders, than incor the opprobrium with which the world would visit such © absurb red-tapeism? We do not even believe an officer would be able to restrain his men, in such a case, if he tried. They would go ashore' in spite of him, to help their kith and kin, Bat if he did succeed in controlling them, he would become a mark for public blame; and a Government which ventured to support him would not master a handred votes on a division. Looking at the matter even from an economical point of view; of course the Chitiese think that, having once exterminated foreigners, they will have done with them. They do not contemplate, at all, the retare of ten times the vamper killed, and the indemnity for damage wrought. But we lo farther. We know that every life sacrificed would have to be compensated; every bale of shirtings made good; and that the British Government would huve to pay the amount to their subjects, pending its recovery from China. Is it possible to conceive two British men-of-war lying by, while property worth more than the cost of the Abyssinian war, was being destroyed? The whole case is too absurd; British Naval officers would be clearly expected to interfere, where alternative is so manifestly im: practicable, asin Shanghai. Atthe same time, we repeat conviction that, were the case reversed, and were interference how strictly soever forbidden no British Commander would hesitate an instant, when he saw his country men in danger. Nelson put his glass to his blind eye, at Copenhagen, when it better for not to see the signal of recall. And every British officer would ignore red-tape instructions, in such an emergency as we have described.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.