The Archive · 1873

Our Policy in Central Asia

Som small crumb of comfort, coming after its previous egregious blunders, is evidently sought for by the present Government of Great Britain in its pretended settlement of the Central Asian question. Russia has lately, as we all know, exhibited a desire to annex the Khanate of Khiva. Khokand and Samarcand she has already ocoupied, and Bokhara is so far under her thumb that the Ameer cannot stir hand or foot without her permission. It is evident that, in such a case, there is a Togical reason why the regularity of her frontier line should not be disturbed by the presence of an alien state within the limit which nature has evidently marked out as the proper frontier line of an empire. Now as Russia, by the seizure of Khokand, practically turned the eastern extremity of the desert of Kizilkum, which had hitherto separated her from the Khanates, she to all intents has become so far mistress of the situation that it is almost vain to argue with her on the propriety of her attempt. We can well understand that the reply of Lord Northbrook to the Khivan ambassadors would explain this position of things, and point out how the geographical condition of matters effectually prevented any hope of succour from India so far as Khiva was concerned. The nation which had not grumbled when Khokand and Di, which really formed the key to Central Asia, were occupied, was not likely to wince at the further swallowing of Khiva, which was but a secondary part in the same game; and this the Khivan authorities, had they been capable of reasoning from the current of affairs, (that is supposing they knew anything about that current), might readily have ascertained without exposing themselves to the doubtless well-intentioned, but certainly rather foolish rebuff of Lord Northbrook. It is not that what the Governor-General said was not true, or that his advice was not, so far as the Khivans were concerned, the best possible; but that it displayed in the eyes of the world an intention to sleep and dream, while the affairs of Central Asia were being worked out by another Power. Now our position in India certainly gives us the right to be heard in events which may at any moment more or less affect ourselves.

The invasion of India from the north, may or may not be a possibility, but in either case it looks like a sign of weakness to stand dreamily by, when an ambitious neighbour is quietly strengthening himself at the other end of the passes which lead to our Indian Empire. It was but the other day that we persuaded ourselves we had well nigh gained anally in the Atalik Ghaza at Kashgar; yet we could not bring ourselves frankly to enter into negotiations with him; and wher, all of a sudden, a thought struck us that something might be done in that direction, we found that Russia had already occupied the post, and that our envoy was left out in the cold, while the other was conducting a treaty in which adroit advantage was taken of our own stipulationsat Tientsin. We of course had nothing to say to the acknowledgment by China of Russian authority in Di, though the matter was conducted under the eye of our Minister at Peking; as in 1859-60 we had nothing to say to the occupation of the sea coast of Manchuria. It is after all this has happened, however, that we find Lord Northbrook's advice to the Khivan Embassy published abroad to the world as a triumph of diplomacy we had forsooth withheld interference long that we were utterly unable to use it to any practical purpose, and having made this discovery we were not content to stop at home and bite our lips, but we publish our discomfiture as a grave diplomatic measure. True, we have allowed the big boy tofore us into a comer, but we have big words to meet him with, if he advances any further. But suppose he does advance, what then?—retreata utile farther and make use of more scolding. The big boy has, however, got us in our humour; we acknowledge ourselves perfectly pleased with what he has done hitherto, so he enters into negotiations with us and asks us to come and look at the chalk line he has drawn. Charming condescension doubtless, but there the line is in black and white, and we may examine it as much as we like, and may gain much ethnological and other logical information thereby; but to quarrel with it, or suggest its rectification, we are pretty plainly given to understand, will only result in its being drawn still closer. Nay, we are not left to imagine some of the uses to which it may be put; we are told straight out that there may be trouble in our own corner, and that its proximity may be made use of to foment still more any internal dissensions which may arise, Such is the latest phase of the great Central Asian question, and the course of our policy regarding it, seems to follow fittingly in the groove which the Gladstone Government has lately traced out.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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