The Archive · 1870

The Political Position

Ir any doubt could have remained, as to the complicity of the officials in the late massacre ut Tientsin, a letter we polish, to-day, must dispel them. Point point, the writers go over the circumstances of the riot, and collate facts, telling in themselves, but irresistible when taken as a whole. They show that the popular excitement was well known; but that the city officials, so far from taking measures to suppress it, issued incentive proclamations; that no notice was taken of the Consuls' representations in regard to these; but that the Prefect has since been complimented and presented with a testimonial for his action. It is shown that the outbreak was thoroughly organised; that the principal actors were members of the Fire Guild, a semiofficial corps, having for leaders men recognised by the Yaméns; that these men assembled in consequence of preconcerted action; and that this preconcerted action was known not only in tientsin, but throughout the entire country round. The Chinese so thoroughly appreciated the intent that they closed their shops and schools, in the threatened neighborhood, before the riot occurred. And now, since its occurrence, not a single attempt has been made to arrest the prominent leaders of the men who were most active in the riot; nor has an inclination been shown to degrade the officials, whose own proclamations are proof of their complicity.

This question of official complicity has avery much more serious interest, for residents in China, generally, than may at first sight appear. It is not merely a question to be taken into cousideration, in future negociations to which the Tientsin massacre may give rise; but it very intimately affects the present and fature safety of all foreign residents, in the country. The fact cannot be too often repeated that, though the people, generally, are well-disposed towards foreigners, their leaders—the officials and the literati, are bitterly inmical. And the influence of the latter, for good or for evil, is immense. If they wish to check excitement, they can do so. If they wish to foment it, they can do so still more easily. The minds of the people, credulous and superstitious, will swallow any tale, however outrageous, against people whom they have been traght to regard as differently constituted, in every respect, from themselves—as eccentric, barbara ous and altogether unaccountable. Assuming, then, as the evidence compels us to assume, that the Tientsin mandarins directly excited and instigated the late massacre, we cannot help facing the possibility of a similar outbreak at any other port in China, at any moment which may seem propitious to the mandarins for indulging their antiforeign feeling. And when we remem-bertha advice of Tsen-kwo-fan, to fight, rather than yield foreign demands, in connexion with the new treaty; when we remember that Ting, in another secret memorial, advised thattheliterati, all over the empire, should be incited to oppose foreign' intercourse; when we recall, moreover, the constant asse-versations of Chinamen, for the last two years, that the Emperor was preparing to drive all foreigners out of the Empire—we cannot but reflect that the tientsin massacre may have been only a trial step; and that what has happened there, may happen, any day, elsewhere. The Chinese themselves frankly say that, unless combined and vigorous action be taken, unless the memory of this outbreak be eclipsed by a complete defeat, it will be followed by uprising, in other parts of China. We know well enough, ourselves, that our arms are irresistible; that a French or English force of 10,000 men could capture Pekin and conquer China, if need were; but the Chinese do not believe it. They say they Lave been preparing, and believe that they are now strong enough to resist, successfully, any foreign attack. They know we have to send long way for our troops, and do not reflect, or will not realise, that a temporary success over a few peaceful residents at the foreign settlements, would bring down swift and terrible retribution, in the short time that would be needed to get anurmy from India, for the purpose. They only look at their present position in China, relatively to the foreign force thatis at present available for resistance, in China; and refuse to consider the certainty that foreigners, once expelled, would return in tenfold force to the attack, and would establish themselves in a ten times stronger position than before. Nothing could be more fatal than the settlement of the affair by negotiation, at Paris. The Mandarins themselves would hardly know the compensation fixed on, and the people would be persuaded that no punishment has been inflicted for the French li lost. They will only understand a policy of force—the return of a blow, anda crushing one, for the blow given.

Itislamentable, in face of this position of affairs, to hear that the British and American Legations avoid making common and hearty cause with the French, at the present crisis, Friendly Chinese themselves take common action for geauted, and say that an unmistakeable demonstration of superiority the exhibition of a large force, and the fiction of a severe blow, is our po-hey, Yet the British Minister is reported to regard the whole affair as a street riot; and to accept the pacific assurances with which it is of course the policy of the Chinese Government to lull him. We aver that the crisis would justify him, in applying to General Whitfield, for the presence of a. giment in Shanghai; and in advising the call, from India, of a strong reinforcement to Hongkong. If report, on the contrary, speak truly of his present views—we do not hesitate to say that he fills incompetently the high post entrusted to him,

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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