Tue proffered settlement of the Tientsin difficulty appears to us more and more unsatisfactory, the more closely we examine it; and the extreme interest which it has ror foreigners in China, justifies our returning to a subject which has already been so fally discussed. It must teach us one of two lessons—either the Central Government sympathised with the outbreak, or it is too weak to punish the instigators, and is therefore not entitled to the extreme respect which Western Governments have elected to pay to its authority. We believe the latter to be the trae state of the case; and can quite believe that Prince Kung has had hard work to gain the assent of other high Mandarins, to the terms which have been at length offered. But this does not alter the fact that these terms are inadequate, nor does it improve the ease of those who inaugurated the new system of China policy. They may urge with some plausibility, that the result of this negotiation has been to establish the goodwill of the Central Government. But the clear—that the goodwin worth little, without the power to give it effect. And the inference is very clear that, with all goodwill, the Regency has Incked power to punish the chief instigators of the deed. It would have been better that nota rioter had suffered, nor a cash been accepted in compensation, if the official instigators of the crime had met the punishment they deserved. But they virtually escape; while a certain number of the deluded men whom they encouraged, pay the extreme penalty for their crime. We are glad to believe that the Ministers at Peking do not accept the terms offered, as satisfactory and conclusive. The escape of the officials, and the circumstances of the punishment of the rioters render the whole affair hollow. But this does not alter the fact that diplomacy has sad-failed, in permitting such a result to be brought about, The fact is, that diplomacy has been elevated by the Western Governments and by their Representatives, to a position higher than it deserves to occupy in dealing with Eastern nations. Assuming, as we now do, that the Regency was either anwillingor incapable, one of two courses only was open to us—or rather only one course under two different phases. Having decided on a solution, just, but severe enough to constrain an Asiatic people, we had either to deal with the matter ourselves on the spot, or to coerce the Central Power if it was unwilling, or to support it if it were weak. But we have done neither. And the result is, that the Ministers have been led to listen to the most irrelevant issues, and in consequence, while striving to grasp the shadow, have allowed the Substance entirely to dade their par-suit. "A diplomatist," they apparently ink, "who has to call in external aid, acknowledges his own defeat;" and sooner than do this, it seems fitter to continu the useless conflict of words, with the certainty of failure in the end. So, it seems to us that tha French Minister has failed, in his negociations, more seriously than would possibly have happened had he, freeing himself from the web of entanglements spun round him by Chinese ingenuity, boldly " placed himself and his cause in the bands of the Admiral at Tientsin.
In all these interminablenegociations, a false idea of diplomacy has been allowed to enter; from being a mere tool, diplomacy lias, in the hands of unskilled workmen, been raised to the position of the engine itself; putting their trast in it, they have forgotten the real motive power; and, in consequence, at the moment when strength is most required, they find themselves unable to make use of the machine. In plain words, diplomacy is merely the method of making use of physical power with the least expenditure of force, and owes its utility entirely to the existence of that force. It may not be advisable to call out an army to settle every trivial dispute; sach a course would be.a waste of energy incompatible with the result. Diplomacy therefore is called into play, and makes such use of that force in the distance, as the circumstances of the case may require. We can imagine a case of Belgium diplomatising for the possession of French Flanders, as we can of France strive ing by similar measures to gain Saxe-Coburg. In the one case, however, we would look upon the project as simply absard, while we could listen long and carefully to the arguments adduced
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.