mending the policy of reference to Peking of matters in dispute with the provincial authorities, was actuated by a'sincere wish, not only to render the settlement of differences more simple and easy, bnt "also by an honest. desire of really strengthening. the executive of the empire, caunut-admit a doubt. That such*a policy was in its nature conferred honour on its originator, is likewise neither to be denied nor ox-plained away. 'Tried by the hard logic of facts, we, however, find that' the British Minister mistook the condit of the Government to which lie was overedited, and that, both with respect to the settlement of disputes and the strengthening of the executive, the scheme has been a failure. The conditions necessary for the latter operation were in good sooth wanting; the Government at Peking had neither the natural tude nor even the desire for thestrengthening process, and though temporarily galvanised towards the close of the Taiping rebellion, when it mast be remembered it was ably supported by its two best provineinl admini: i. hung-chang and Tseng-kwo-fan, yet no sooner was the necessity fo¥ action removed than it fell back on its old policy of inertness, or at lerist-of strive ing to rule by the policy of arousing differences between its two principal subordinates. No sooner in fact was Nanking taken, and the Governmentin a fair way of regaining the prestige once, though bat temporarily in the time of the early sovereigns of the dynasty, ex-excised over the Empire, than it returned to the last resort of waning power, thooid maxim of divide et impera. Tsing, who, up to this time at least, had given'no sign of unfaithfulness towards the Court, was the first to fall under suspicion, and repented attempts were made to get him within the power of the party at Poking. Too wary to show any outward sign of insubordination, or too loyal perhaps to harbour the thought, he contented himself with the administration of his province till called, after the death of Saukolinsin, to beat back the Nienfei_ in Honan and Shantang. Herehefound himself played off in turn against Li and Watan; by the former of whom he was eventually superseded in command, returning to his old provincial post. If, since his second administration, the ways of the Viceroy have not been marked by the same straightforward conduct as characterised them at first; if, as rumour alleges, Tsing has found it necessary to strengthen his hands by alliances at least questionable, it is but to remember that thefirstsymptoms of distrust proceeded from the capital. Po such an extent indeed has this feeling of distrust been carried that, at the present moment, there is perhaps lardly one of the high provincial authorities on whose honour or loyalty the Imperial Court could rely. The great scheme of strengthening the Execative lias become, through.its own inherent weakness, an utter failure; and thegrent provincial authorities are apparently less bound by its restraints than at -any former period of. which we have experience. It is not, however, to draw attention to this merely sentimental side of the question that we revert to an old topic: it "has its positive as well as negative side, and the former of these' seems now to be becoming more prominent. If it be the Policy of the provincial administrators, o of any of them, fo'really weaken the power of the Central Executive, the policy of the present British Government, of blind reference to Peking, is capable of being' made an engine towards thatresalt. The massacre at Tientsin, where the Executive manifestly feared to exercise its nominal powers, was an instance in point; and recent circumstances at, Nanking and Yangchow seem to point to a similar conclusion. The leader of the bands of murderers, who burned the cathedral atTientsin and slaughtered defenceless men and women, was apparently too powerful to be taken by the Central Government; yot we find that, no sooner does he stand in the way of a provincial Viceroy, than he at otice has to euccamb. Wrongs committed on foreigners may thus he converted into engines for the exorcise of pressure on the Central government. Assured by the continued utterances of European States that all external pressure is to be applied at the capital, the provincial authorities seem, under cover of their promised immanity, to become less careful of committing wrongs: The very references to Peking, and the futile efforts made by the'Court to patch up affairs are, in fact, the silent witnesses of its weakness, the display of which cannot but be agreoable to men who, for the most part, have -their own grievances to complain of. In addition, signs are not wanting that disturbances, or threatened distur-* bances, against foreigners are becoming atk engine of intimidation on the part of the provincial officers. They afford a-favourable pretext for getting rid of an obnoxious official, or for turning away too prying enquiries from headquarters. Something of this sort seems to be the mainspring of such reports as were occasionally heard from Yangchow and elsewhere. The very threat of a missionary disturbance, we may be assured, causes trembling in Peking; while the provincial administration, practically assured of immunity from panishment, looks blandly on. This is an.unsatisfactory state of affairs, yet it seems a practical result of the attempt to carry oura policy of centralisation whoero all the conditions of time' and place are adverse.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.