Tae news which comes to us from Europe of the defeat of the Chinese army by the forces of the Ameer of Kashgar, although not confirmed by the reports in the Peking Gazette, is so far in accordance with what we read in that periodical, that there seems little yeason to doubt its substantial trath.
From what we can learn of the position of affairs in the Tien-shan Pih-lu, the fighting must have partaken in some measure of a triangular character. The inhabitants, for the most part Tungunees, seem to be hostile to both Chinese and Kashgarese, and seem to give an equal amount of trouble to each. Pho posts said to have been captured by the Ameer's son, do not, from the official returns in the Peking Gazette, seem to have been occupied at all by the Chinese troops, who remain by the Jatest accounts in the neighbourhood of Hami, near the western extremity of the Great Wall. In May last, we republished from the Peking Gazette a description of the army destined by the Chinese for the attack on the Ameer's troops. It certainly did not look very formidable, even on paper. It was composed of forty odd battalions of infantry and cavalry, each battalion of the former numbering 500 men, and of the latter 250. In addition to this force, was a division of some 375 Manchu cavalry, forming a separate command, In all, it was calculated there were 17,000 troops of all arms, including a force of 2000 men which had been formerly in the field, commanded by an officer under sentence of degradation. This force was under the command of an officer named Kin-shun. Besides, and already arrived at Hami, was a force the numbers of which is not stated, under a General named Mingchuan. Supposing that the force thus described were really up to the number of men stated, it will be seen that it formed but a slender army to undertake the conquest of Kashgaria, as, for want of a better word, we must call the Ameer's dominions. It was, besides, at a distance from its supplies. Provisions had to be collected in Kan-sub, and sent forward through the Yumen Pass, and such was the distance and the difficulty of the route, that Tso Tsung.-tang adds that the cost of carriage many times exceeded the original price of the articles. In addition to this force in Kansu, the Chinese seem to have had another in Tarbagatai, acting on the flank of the Ameer's army, and which was in or about May last at Kur-kara Usu. The officer in command of this latter force reports, in or about July last, that he had assumed a defensive attitude, and was contenting himself with patching up the ramparts between Ili, then in possession of the Ameer's forces, and Tarbugatai. At the same time, we learn from a ral at Urumtsi, that the post had never since the outbreak in 1864 been recovered by the imperial forces, but was still in insurgent hands. It would seem, therefore, that the victory stated to have been gained over the Chinese army must have been over the forces stationed in Tarbugutai under the command of Yung-ts'iuen, titular Military Governor of Ili, And the occupation of Uramtsi, would seem to imply either that the Tangunees had joined bodily the forces of the Ameer, or that the latter had taken forcible possession of that portion of territory. The Ameer's son in either ease would find himself opposed to the Chinese forces under command of King-lien, and which include the 17,000 men under Kinshen at Hami. he district occupied by the Ameer's troops, in consequence of the victory, is an important one, and comprises almost all the remaining district south of the Tien-shan. The Ameer's dominions are thus, with the exception of Hami still in Chinese hands, nearly conterminous with the desert of Gobi. It is unlikely that this state of affairs will long continue. The Ameer is not likely to rest satisfied that Hami should remain in Chinese hands, while they on their part will endeavour to recover the ground lost in 1864. Tso Tsung-tang, and the officers acting with bim will, however, have a more determined and better prepared foe to deal with, than the scattered hordes of Mahommedan insurgents with whom they have previously had to cope. The difficulties about supplies are not likely to be diminished by the occupation of Urumtsi by Kuli Beg, while he will have a fertile district behind him to provision his army on the spot. If it be difficult to keep up an army at Hami, it is unlikely that the Chinese will find it easier in Tarbagatai, dependent as it is on Uliasutai as its base of operations; and in any case Kuli Beg has substantially divided the two armies, and can, with his own head-quarters at Uramtsi, effectually keep both in check.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.