Tax now Blue Book on the Yinnan affair. brings.down the narrative of the negotiations: regarding the Yiiuian outrage to.the end of June, in so far as Sir'Thomas Wade's proceedings are concerned; but stops short, so far as regards Mr. Grosvenor's mission, with the, arrival of the. party. at Yunnan-fu. The despatches now printedgiveinteresting details, of the progress of, the nogotiations, but do not add much to what was already known of their general course. It is the narrative of Mr. Grosvenor's experiences that was looked forward to with most interest, and the delay in its -publication is to be regretted. From one-source and another pretty good information was obtained of what.was going on at Peking, but of. Mr. Grosvenor's mission and its results. we were. still in profound ignorance. That it had no very practical results, is generally understood; but the narrative will still have interest, and there are many matters upon which information is still lacking, that. the report. might be expected to supply. Historically, then, the despatches now published do not add much to our information, nor afford much theme for additional comment; but there are some curious incidents recorded, which deserve to be placed in broader daylight, We should hardly, for instance, have expected to hear the Tichborne trial named by a Chinese, still less in con nexion with such a matter. Yet, we find Hoi, who was at that time the junior Envoy designate to Great Britain, mentioning it conversationally to Mr. Hillier, as a proof that "even in Eng. land judicial enquiry was not always successful." We referred some time ago to the degree of attention foreign newspapers receive from the Chinese, and here is an instance how readily they can turn what they find there to their own purposes. We do not mean that Mr. Hsii attempted to urge the point as an important argoment; on the contrary, his remark seems to have been made in a very casual way. What is worth noting, merely, is the knowledge shown and the readiness to apply it. Sir Thomas Wade himself, too, in an earlier despatch to Lord Derby, refers to the effect of this novel kind of reading upon the minds of the Peking statesmen. The time has come, he writes, " when the Chinese must be made distinctly to understand that if they trifle with us in this case, a severe chastisement will be inflicted upon the Government. To this understand. ing, what has fallen. from me, or what I have been instructed to write, has not contributed -more than a pass ing influence. Their long habituation to the near approach of dangers calculated to imperil the very existence of the Empire, has confirmed them in their constitutional immobility. They are besides confirmed in their uuwillingness at all times to believe in the worst, by their faith in lick; and the tone of our newspaper articles and speeches, which, even when they discover a determination perfectly intelligible in England, to.exact what is due to us in this instance, scarcely ever fail to enlarge upon our consideration for China, our interests in the country, and our consequent unwillingness to strike,—=produces among the Chinese but one effect. The weight of the few words that, taken alone, are more or less intimidatory, is. entirely counterbalanced bythe expressions of good will and sympathy which Iam, as much as any man, delighted to think that we feel towards this nation." It is easy to-understand how the stress which was Isid in some Englishpapers on the fear entertained in Downing Street of shattering the dynasty by too rough handling, might go far to counteract the urgent representations of a. Minister.
Sir Thomas Wade points out, the indication of our unwillingness to strike would more than counterbalance the expression of determination to exact what was due, with statesmen ao habituated to political dangers and so constitutionally immobile. This reflection will no doubt go far to account for the reticence so carefully maintained at Peking during the progress of negotiations. It is easy to push this consideration to an extreme, and to incur an evil greater than that which it is sought to avoid. To withhold reliable.information is to risk the publication of incorrect state. ments; and both these statements and the comments that might be made upon them would be liable. to produce more misconception than a frank utterance of the trath. Still, one can understand the apprehension weighing upon a diplomatist's mind. Whatever may be the best immediate antidote, there is no doubt that misconception does arise, and, as we wrote some months ago, "it will not be till the Chinese are far more intimately acquainted than they are at present, with foreign polities and modes of thought, that the inconvenience will conse."
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.