Next to the purchase of the Khedive's interest in the Suez Canal, the oconpation of Cypras by. England is one of the most unexpected results of the present condition of Eastern affairs. It is remarkable, as showing the self-reliance of the present Premier of England, that in neither case did any expression of public opinion lead up to the act. Something recommended itself in both cases to be dono, and the opportunity was taken of doing it without paving the way or raising se, complications by taking the whole world into confidence. Now, while from the vague and unsatisfactory utterances of Reuter, we can form no opinion as to the courses loading up tothe occupation of Cypras, we can at a glance see the circumstances which induced the English Government to take the step. It is, in fact; the logical sequence of the position of part ownership of the Suez Canal, affording a strong standpoint whence British interests' in the Canal, which are not confined to the amount of scrip held, may be easiest and best protected. But there is another and more important use to which the occupation of Cyprus will tond. For forty years, a railway from the Levant down the Valley of the Euphrates has been the dream of Indian statesmen, but many circumstances concurred to prevent its taking a practical shape. It would lead along a country which, however rich in ancient times, in these degenerate days has become reduced to little more than a desert. It would have passed through Turkish territory, over which for many strong reasons Great Britain did not desire to exercise a control which might load to armed intervention; and in the third place it was inconveniently near to the ever advancing Armenian frontier of Russia, and might afford too great a temptation for that all-grasping Power to resist. The recent war has, how-over, altered in most respects the relative position of the Powers interested. While Austria as well as England has drawn the limit to Russian advance in Enrope, on England alone basapparently been thrown the onus of protecting Asia. If woreed the telegrams aright, England has assumed towards Turkey a more immediate protectorate than before, and in return for this has claimed the right of more intimate control of her internal administration.
To enable Great Britain to carry out such @ protectorate, it was necessary she should be placed in a powerful Position whence any sudden attempts at violation of the frontiers could be at once met, and it will be readily seen how perfectly Cyprus lends itself to such a case. England has two means of access to the highlands of Armenia, one from the-east by way of the Persian Gulf, and the other from the Mediterranean by the port of Alexandretta, in the north-east angle of the Levant. From Alexandretta to the Euphrates is a little over a hundred miles, and two armies sent, one from Bussorah and the other from Alexandretta, could readily unite at any point on the Southern boundary of Armenia. Alexandretta is, however, a long way from England, or even from Malta, our nearest military station. From Famagousta, the ancient Salamis, in Cyprus, it is, however, only about one hundred and sixty miles; while from the same point to Port Said at the entrance of the Suez Canal it is only about three hundred. With naval commend of the Cypras may be made to effectually protect the entrance of these two great routes to India, and to bar avy attempt to cut off by 8 coup de main the communications of the Empire. Even with the possession of Batoum and undisputed command of the Black Sea, Russia would experience far greater difficulties in reaching the upper waters of the Euphrates, ari as her political relations with the i.abitante of the districts to be traversed have not been improved by recent events, we are apparently justified in the conclusion that one road of hostile approach from Russian eastwards is in a fair way of being effectually blocked. We cannot as yet judge of the reasons why the union of Cypros should be looked upon in England with dis. favour; though we can conceive many and grave objections to the giving up of Batoum to Russia. Although the establishment of the Euphrates valley route to India, with the powerful position of Cyprus to guard its western terminus, may effectually cut off the most important line of access to south. ern Asia, it is clear that in obtaining Batoum Russia acquires undisputed possession of the valley of the Kur, and thus by means of the Caspian and the Oxus valley opens a safe though tedious route into Central Asia. Whatever power holds undisputed possession of the Caspian will always have a preponderating influence in the valley of the Oxus, and it certainly seems unwise when the favourable opportunity arrived, that steps were vot taken to ensure the means of access in case of need to that large inland sea. The stipulations about Batoum being a free port are, we fear, of that nature that they are not likely to be carried out practically by a power so opposed to free trade as Russia; yet free trade is one of the necessities of Central Asia, if that country is ever to be relieved from its present state of degradation, Altogether, if the cause of civilisation has gained something by the Congress, it has not gained all that might have been demanded towards a final settlement.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.