A wan may, like William Blake, most conscientiously hold peculiar notions about the propriety of wearing clothes, but so long as civilised society is constituted as it is, and the police force retains any remnant of efficiency, the motives that restrain him from representing his theories in practice will be stronger than those which impel him to cot up to his convictions. He may oven, again, like the erratic genius we have just mentioned, take part from time to time in "acting a little Adam and Eve," if he be blessed with a wife as unconventional og himself. But ever since the days of St. Agnes, when a holy virgin could well dispense with clothes, seeing that anyone who looked at her was struck blind, such vagaries as Blake and his wife indulged in have had to be confined rigidly within the four walls of the performer's house.
respect of ordinary decency, then, private views where they clash with public sentiment are ruthlessly overruled, and no sano stickler for the rights of private judgment and personal liberty would, we imagine, question the propriety of this interference with individual freedom. The question then suggests itself whether, in matters of faith og well og in matters of morals, society, in this case represented by a great mass of persons who profess to hold in a general way a certain set of beliefs, has the right to expect from all its members at least outward conform. ity in the expression of those beliefs. In other words, is it indecent for a man to expose himself publicly without beliefs, just as it would he indecent for him to expose himself publicly without clothes. There are obvious analogies between the tivo cases, for, for example, professions of belief may without any straining of similes be described as the veil of a man's spiritual body in much the same way as clothing is the veil of his material body. Beauties or defects may in either case be concealed, but the essential point is that in both we see the man not necessarily es he is but as he wishes to appear. So again, there are many orthodox persons to whom the spectacle of a reasonable being without such a stated form of belief as meets their approbation, is as painful and disgusting as the spectacle of a naked lunatic just escaped from his keeper. If the two exhibitions are not in their eyes equally demoralising, it is because a person who declines to clothe his inner man according to the recognised fashion or something approach. ing it, is far more dangerous to society than a person who considers clothes a useless encumbrance.
What is commonly called a religions man is one in whose nature reverence for certain groups of beliefs not representable in consciousness occupies an important position, Such reverence arises out of a sense of continual dependence upon something outside him which, though undefinable, is very real to him. It leads him to find both duty and pleasure in the public acknowledgment of that reverent dependence. It is good for him to yield to his honest impulses, and to make profession of the faith that is in him. His profession is in fact a part of his virtue, There are, however, at the present day, just as there have been at all periods of history, many perfectly honest, perfectly moral, and com-potently educated persons who, after conscientious examination of existing creeds, find them each and all either incomprehensible or self-contradictory, either obviously false or palpably absurd. It is no pleasure to them to romain ina state of mental suspense upon matters which, if worthy of any attention, are of the very highest importance. But they consider it immoral to accept upon authority any unverifiable statement, and, apart from what appears to them the immorality of such an act, they find it impossible to perform it. They are forced either by the original cast of their minds, over which they have bad no control, or by surrounding influences, avoidable or unavoidable, to find virtue only in the doing of good and the searching for truth. That the search is often fruitless does not discourage them, or tempt them to accept conclusions drawn from sources outside consciousness. But they judge for themselves, not for others; and they are ready to admit the practical value of any religion which leads or drives to at least the outward practice of virtue those who would otherwise plane into vice. Hence, they are no vulgar deriders of popular beliefs; they would believe if they could, but the emotional side of their nature is so little developed or is so carefully smothered up that no softening influence arises from it to cloud the bare intelligence. This being their real position with regard to existing formulas, the enquiry we would make is whether their apparent position should be something different, We assume on the one hand that those whom we describe undertake no propaganda among persons incompetent to understand the issues raised on either side, and on the other hand that no fear of social disabilities or of penalties to be inflicted by some self-constituted tri-burial, influences their decision. Tach person we may suppose will obey his conscience, but his conscience may lead him right or wrong. How it ought to lead him has been at various times settled in different ways.
Tu Greece, the popular creed was treated with silence by the great tra. gedinns, was Inden with contempt by the philosophers, and was openly and coarsely derided by the comedians, Yet so soon as scorn for religious observances began to influence the sceptic's daily life in public, accusers were always forthcoming to bring a charge of impiety, and the judges were ever ready to oxpinte their individual free-thinking by collective sentence of death or exile on the defendant.
Thus, to mention only the best known names, Socrates was judicially mur. dered, and Anaxagoras exiled from Athons, on the ground of their contempt for the State religion, while Stilpo was driven into banishment for denying the divinity of the Athene of Phidias. In Rome, all educated men were either atheists or pure theists, The com. monalty was accustomed to find the gods held ap on the comic stage and in popular poetry as patterns of vice, Cate publicly expressed his wonder that two augurs could meet without langhing. But while speculating most freely in private, the philosophers conformed in public to the rites and ceremonies of the popular religion. Cicero was an augur, Cesar was s priest of Jupiter. Indeed the Stoics expressly taught that whatever might be a man's personal opinions, he ought to offer an outward homage to the belief of his countrymen. Tu the later ages of the Roman commonwealth, when Christianity was first persecuted, and afterwards in ture bo-came a persecutor; in the Middle Ages, when, the most abandoned life and, what is stranger still, the bitterest Iampoons on the monastic orders, were condoned in consideration of regular attendance at Mass and a formal obedience to the edicts of the Charch in England, when conformity with the established religion was demanded as an essential qualification from every candidate for public employment, adhension to any particular reed necessarily came to be as purely a form of business as the putting on of clothes. The effect upon private and public morals was in all instances disastrous, and would be no less disastrous
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.