Tun discovery of the plot at Tientain to massacre foreigners, and then probably to raise the standard of rebellion, is an instance of the danger to be apprehended by any sudden stimulus in an ill-regulated country like China. We draw attention to the danger likely to accrue from the preparations for war with Japan. Those most intimate with Chinese ways, have all through expressed their conviction that beyond, if not indeed in place of, hostility to Japan, there existed a hope in many quarters that the probable outbreak of a war with that Power would lead to the opportunity long sought, of exciting a cause of quarrel with foreigners generally. In fact, it has been mooted here weeks ago, and, therefore, before the recent affair at Tientsin could have had any effect on foreign opinions, that the first result of a war with Japan would be seized as an opportunity by discontented spirits in this province to raise the standard of revolt. By a curious concatenation of circumstances, it seems to be a settled thing at present in China that plots against Government should be more or less intimately connected with a settled hostility towards foreigners, and this occurring at such distant spots as Shanghai and Tientsin, as well as displaying itself in the conduct of troops at Chinkiang and Nanking, may well remind us of the state of affairs existing in 1870. not that the present Government of China is to be considered as in any respect favourable towards foreigners, or foreign influence, for of the contrary we have had some proof; but it is that the ery of a general massacre and pillage of foreigners has a certain charm for the imagination of those restless spirits who love rebellion and its accompaniments for their own sake. We have not far to seek for a similar state of affairs, for the last revolution in Japan was ushered in by conditions not altogether unlike what we see around us. The disaffected towards the Government made foreigners their principal point of attack, not more from any settled antipathy to foreigners in general, than from a conviction that thereby they were embarrassing in the most serious manner Government whose conduct they detested. Now, it is undeniable that the dangerous classes in China have some direct causes of complaint against foreigners, and that the Chinese Government is more or less indebted to foreigners for its present position. It was through the influence of foreigners, exercised both directly and indirectly, that the Taiping rebellion was finally extinguished; and there is no doubt that many of the restless spirits connected with the movement are still alive, and actively plotting a revival of the state of anarchy into which China was plunged some fourteen years ago. Since that time, the influence of foreigners has been steadily, though not always intentionally, directed to the strengthen. ing of the present Government. The so-called hardships inflicted on China by the treaty of Tientsin have resulted in a general improvement of the finances of the empire, and these have been persistently applied to strengthening the Arsenals and increasing the army. It is quite true that the latter has been a dangerous work. We pointed out in our issue of the 22nd ult., how little that army was to be depended on, and recent disclosures have more than proved the truth of what we then said. Still there has been sufficient cause to make the lovers of disorder more than usually discontented. No space existed in the greater portion of the eighteen provinces for any open rising: The rich provinces of the seaboard, where foreigners more especially were extending their influence, were in a state of profound peace. The people wore becoming reasonably well off for Chinese peasants, while all the while the old agitators found the ground slip. ping from beneath their feet. These are the circumstances under which we are placed. Though eventually they augur sufficiently well, the present is a time when it more especially behoves Foreign Powers to be on their guard. The clements of danger are about, and the organization of the Chinese Government would probably be found unequal to any sudden shock. It is with no object of raising a panic that we write these lines, but in times like the present it is well to remember that forewarned is forearmed.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.