We would certainly wish, in the interests of all concerned, that the newly resusciidea of strength i foreign cou tion of British Ministe would cease. The policy hinted at by the Economist commented on by ourselves a few 3 nye, had, it seem, already reached Peking, and our last advices tell us of the mem. bers of the Tsung-li Yamen from place to place in a futile attempt to "strengthen the Peace Party." The history of the last fifty years must be seen through some extremely grotesque medium if the observer can fail to see how invariably this so-called process of strengthening has resulted in estrange ing the party or individual intended to be strengthened, nor is the reason far to seek, or encumbered by any abstruse principles of diplomatic minds or irre. solvable equations. Let us Jock at the present instance of strengthening and see what are the arguments available, It is doubtless not in the interest of Great Britain that China should undergo any considerable reverse at the hands of Russia, or indeed of any other Power. Unfortunately, at the moment, nations have a natural tendency to cleave into two sections, the bullies and the bullied, and Russia, having for some time been permitted by the consent of the other Powers to assume the former is seeking to place China in the latter. That under the eireamstances the influence of the British Minister should be invoked is but natural, and that a British Government should ct its Minister, when applied to, to afford sound and useful advice is both correct and decorous. That o British Government should, moreover, when British interests are at stake, proceed still further and direct its Minister to take stronger measures than mere advice is also right and proper, but when once these stronger measures are adopted we conceive it is in honour bound to seo them carried out. Wo fail, however, to perceive in what way' our interests can be subserved by the very questionable course being pursued of attempting to raise factions within the Government of a friendly State, and of pitting one statesman or party against another. That it may be highly inadvisable for China to go to war with Rassia on the Kuldja question we are ready to admit; that it would be prejudicial to our interests, in the event of such a war, that any attempt should be made to interfere with our trade at the open ports is a fact past question, It may therefore be right for us to point out to the Chinese the disadvantages of the former step; but further than this, auloss we are disposed to proceed to still stronger measures, will evidently place us in a false position with one side or the other. With regard to the latter point, our immediate interests come into play, and it becomes quite as allowable for us to state to both parties that we shall not permit the quarrel about Kuldja to be made a pretext for interfering with our communications with the Far East, as to tamely submit to what would certainly ule neither to our profit nor credit. As usual, in our attempts at diplomatic interference, we are already too late in the field. There was a time when we could have exercised our undoubted influence to effect a settlement of Central Asian difficulties, and that, was when Yakoob Beg still occupied the
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.