Tae article in the last number of the Nineteenth Century on the Fallacy of Materialism, by Dr. Goodwin, Bishop of Carlisle, is one of the most valuable contributions to the great controversy of modern times that has appeared for months, The Innguage in which it written is admirably forcible and clear; the Bishop does not envelop his argaments in a cloud of words as so many writers of the present day are apt to do, but states them in pure, lucid, almost colloquial English that places them at once within the rench of the linatiest' and most superficial reader. The claim pnt forward by Dr. Goodwin is that he lias proved by simple de. monstration, "depending on the recognised conclusions of pbysico-mathematical science," that mind is distinct from, independent of, and anterior to, matter; a proposition which must be held to lidate the theory that the one is simply phase or attribute of the other, while it forbids atheism and forms the scientific basis of a theology. We propose to indicate the steps by which the Bishop arrives at this conclusion, The article which precedes the one under review, that by Mr. George Romanes, would perhaps have been more fittingly assigned the cond place; seeing that it approaches the subject from a point of view which supplements and fortifies the lines Inid down by Dr. Goodwin, whose system of attack is calculated to prepare the reader's mind for the more intricate and laboured reasoning which should follow it. We will not dwell upon Mr. Romanes's essay. He argues that as we can only become conscious of matter by the medium of thought, it is necessary, as Professor Caird points out, first te presuppose the existence of that thought, or thinking self, which, according to the materialistic school, is simply an emanation of the matter whose existence it in turn revenue; adding that "to make thought a fane. tion of matter is, thus, simply to make thought a function of itself." The Bishop, on ide, proceeds to his demonstration from a more objective standpoint. One of the grent primary attributes of matter is its indestractibi lity, Though subject to a myriad transformations, not one particle of matter can be annihilated. It follows from this that the whole quantity of matter in existence—tho entire sum of both Seen and Unseen Uuiverse—must be fixed and constant. Farther, to make the reasoning more distinct, this mings of matter oan be expressed in figures, representing a certain number of tons and pounds. We can weigh the Solar System, and, if we had appropriate applinnoes, might quite as easily find the sum-total of the weight of every existence which has a pouderable character. But if this be once admitted, the concession must follow that there is some reason why there should be this exact quantity or number, and not another. There is oer-tainly no power or property inherent in matter itself whereby it determines its own amount. On the contrary, matter must first exist, and its quan. tity be thereby determined, before any property can possibly be ascribed to it or belong toit. The clear deduction from this is certainly that there must be some ontaside, independent. cause, some power, or will, or principle, to which the determination is to be attributed. To talk about chance' is to beg the question, and, what is far worse, to use a term of which science knows nothing. In neither physics nor metaphysics is there such a factor as chance. What, then, is this det mining power, which is at once external and superior to matter? May we not call it Mind? The reasoning here seems clear enough; the conclusion is inevitable. But there is more than this, The same argument may with equal justice be applied to energy. "The total energy of any material system," writes Clark Maxwell, "is.a quantity which can. neither be increased -nor diminished by avy action between the parts of the system, though it may be transformed into any of the forms of which energy is susceptible." Here again the same conclusion The power quantity of energy no more resides in matter than that which determines the quantity of matter itself; still less is it rensouable to suppose that energy can have determined its own amount. Nor, to vary the argument, missible to say that the energy and its various rauifestations and divergences can have been determined. Bat a determining exists; and it is shown to r neither matter nor force. It is impor ible, therefore, to resist the conclu that it resides outside of both, and is therefore anterior to both; and we are landed in a demonstration from natural es that the supernatural existe, conceivable that the argument may be attacked by a denial that the quantities of matter and of energy can be proved always to be the same in their respective spheres. There may be, in regions unknown to us, changes produced by the annihilation or production of matter through the instrumentality of some law outside the limits of those with which woe are acquainted; but this concession, even if made, would not invalidate our reasoning. Who, what, or whence is the power which thus interferes? For in any case it cannot reside in the existences whioh by the hypothesis are subject to it. More light may be thrown upon these profound secrets of Nature as research goes on; but it would be premature to speculate upon the exact results of such enquiry, though safi exist for indicating their ing. We will conclude with one very remarkable thought, which is put with much fineness by the Bishop. It may help us, he thinks, to conceive of mind as existing altogether spart from mat-
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.