In spite of the premature nature of the late ramours of a pacific settle-mont of the Franco-Chinese difficulty—ramours the truth of which is denied in the highest quartors—it is generally believed that China has virtually decided to avoid trying the fortunes of war with France, and that France will be left to enjoy whatever advantages the ownership of Aunam and Tonquin may bring her. She will then, with the extorted consent of Chinn, Lave a now frontier extending to the boundaries of the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Kuangsi; while China, having taken the high ground of lordship over the territories, will thus probably let them go, and console herself with the sensible consideration that the loss of the land is preferable to the risks of a war. She will live upon the glories of the past, when French ambilian never came between the wind and her supremney; and follow her traditions by giving a refuge, should he seek it, to the dethroned King in the shape of a ruinous old fu or "court" at Poking, appropriately situated in the neighbourhood of the white elephant arables, As with Japan in 1874, as with Russia in 1880-1881, China refuses to engage in a conflict with a foreign foo, and, if rightly considered, her timidity is the outcome of wisdom. China is utterly unprepared for war, and a signal reverso would, as her rulers well know, be followed by internal rebellion and, probably, the capsize of the Ta Tsing dynasty.
Since 1860, directly the Allied forces wore withdrawn from Peking, the lenders of China, the foremost of whom was Tseng Kuo-fan, have striven to build upo militant force in the Empire whichshonld be capable both of crushing internecine strife and of coping with hostile West. ern invasions. Yet in this year of 1883, after vast sams Lave been expended in the purchase of foreign weapons and ships, in the establishment of arsenals, the formation of camps and the crea. tion of & navy, the Empire of China la soarocly stronger for dofonce,—aggression is onto thequestion—than it was twenty-three years ago. The cause of the utter failure to make the Empire into a military power, notwithstanding a boundless resources of hardy and resolute men, is ensily defined. The insurmountable hindrance which pre. vents China becoming a military nation, comparable even to Japan, is the provincial autonomy, The counsels and plans of Tséog Kuo-fav, Li Hang. chang, Tso Taung-\'aug, Shen Pao-chen, Ting Pao-chen, nud a few others have, it must be admitted, been prudent, practical, and prescient; bat in the existing etrifo between the Imperial rule and the provincial officials, it has been found impossible to enforce obedience to orders, and so, for all military purposes, China remains, as concerns her organization of actual forces existing, 1 dislocated and chaotic Empire of eighteen independent provinces. The only province that possesses the nucleus of a real army is Chibli, where the Viceroy Li lad nominally about 70,000 partially trained men under his orders, and in reality not half that number, The troops of Chihli are well armed with the Mauser rifle, have sixteen or twenty batteries of Krupp guns, and are fairly well drilled and equipped. The meu are of excellent quality, but the officers, for the most part, fare execrable, and in all the force there is not one leader capable of doing aught but defending an in. trenched position, or making direct front attack, The army of Li has not one engineer officer, not a single doctor, not an ounce of medicine. No trans. port has over been organized, and the commanders are entirely ignorant of the rudiments of strategy. If Li's force, the only partially disciplined force in China, should over be puted against a foreign foo, a quick turning movement and vigorous flank attack would bring the best host of China to ater confusion and disintegrating rout. As to the troops of the other seventeen provinces, there are none of any real value against a foreign enemy. Tso's former force in the North-west has dono effective work against the Dzunganis and Kashgariaus, mostly on account of the possession of artillery which the ill-armed Moslems were unable to withataud; but the Chinese army, whose chief posts are in Kashgar, Ta-ba-ga-tai, and Ili, is in reality a badly-urined rabble of predatory braves, some of whom have Remington rifles, others Sniders, but for the most part old smooth-bore muskets and matchlocks, Tso's present army in the Hung-kiang isan andiscipliued and untrustworthy force, and in the Min-che, the Liang-kuang, and the other governments of China there are rabble hordes, utterly useless for meeting a foreign foe. And under the existing conditions of Chinese polity improvement is impossible. No reform or general amendment can be enforced, Before any reform can be began it is necesenty to establish a supreme and central directing power, and to such a change the provincial authorities are, one and all, hostile. To give to China the rudiments of military organization, the whole forces of the Eighteen Provinces, actual and potential, should be put under an Imperial and supreme directorate, which should have full power to enforce unity of levy, discipline, armament, pay, and tactical organization; and as thereby the illicit gains and vested right of officials to rob would come to an end, a strenuous and, '80 far, successful opposition has always been raised against the first and most necessary step, which in consequences has never been taken. Before China, with all her immense Intent forces, can emerge from her present helpless con-ition, the provincial autonomy, which isa usurpation to which Peking has unwillingly been compelled to submit, must be abolished. At present the usurpers are so strong thatthe are likely to resist reform, until some crushing nat tional humiliation enables the Imperial Government—if it survived the shock—to call upon the people to assist the throne against the mandarinate, China must remain helpless until she can organize and turn to account her sea and land forces. The way of doing this would be the appointment of an Imperial Commissioner and Board of highest officials, who should form in Peking what would in fact be " War Office. The plan of uniform organiza" jou should be determined, and then imposed on all the Kighteon Provinces systematically, so that by the first orders issued the whole military and naval system should be controlled, unchallonged, by Poking, from whence sequential orders should be issued which would organize, direct, and control the whole forces of the Chinese Empire, At present there is nosuprome direction, nor can there be while proviuvial power remains unchecked and undiminished. Until " thorough change is made by suppressing provincial independence of central authority, Ohina must remain, what she now is, @ vast nation whose military power is unworthy of her. Li, who has no illusions about the real weak. ness of the Empire, is wise in wishing to avoid a conflict the result of which, if France put forth adequate forces, would inevitably be overwhelming disaster to Chinn, But the troubles and Lumiliations of China are not over. Itis probable, as soon as China has capitulated, that a new shock will befall the Empire. Franco has had grant expenses in Annam and Tonquin, which it pleases her to attribute to the action of China, The despatch of troops, ironclads, and war stores is costly, and China will be expected to pay the bill, If, as is ramoured, the French Go. vernment hus given orders to move 30,080 troops and twenty-four war vessels for action against Canton, (as we hear it was decided in France that if war was made it should be upon Chinese soil, and begun by the occnpation of Canton,) the Chinese Govern-mout will be asked to indemnify France for the vast costs of preparation. It is not necessary on the present occasion to bring such demands to the test of equity; but it will not surprise. us, when France obtains from China a formal withdrawal of all legal or traditional rights of suzerainty over Aunam and Tonquin, to seo a bill for sight or ten millions of taels presented to the Imperial Chinese: Government for payment. The amount will not cripple her resources, but its payment cannot but entail a humiliation upon China of the keenest and most exasperating nature.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.