In does not need much political foresight—that quality in which, as a Correspondent observes, the Chinese Government is so conspicuously defi eut—to form a pretty accurate i to which country in these latitudes is to be the next scene of complications, more or less serious. The Convention agreed to between Li Dung-t'aug and Count Ito is scarcely of a nature to set at rest, once and for ever, all questions relating to Corea, and there is nothing, as far as we can see, to prevent that unfortunate country from again becoming the victim of either internecine strife or foreign designs. Should the return to Seoul of the Dai In Kun give rise to the former, as is by no means improbable, Corea will, for a time at any rate, be left to her own resources in the struggle; for neither China nor Jupan would be at liberty to interpose on behalf of the King without firat giving due notice of Ler iuteutiou to the other, in writing, arid the time thus taken up by diplomatic correspondence would probably be sufficient to permit of the overthrow of the Corean dynasty and the loss of thousands of lives. The Japanese Legation might be burned down for the third time, the Japanese Mivister might even be killed, but Japan has no right to send armed help until she has given due notice to China of ber intention to do so; while China might see her so-called vassal State invaded by a foreign Power, and yet be unable to go to its assistance before much valuable time had been wasted in communicating Ler intention to Japan. Corea, from a geographical standpoint, is an eminently important place, absolutely unimportant though it be as a Power. It lies hemmed in by three great countries, by each of whom it is regarded with different feelings, but to all of whom its inter grity at the present juncture is a matter of considerable consequence. Nothing, probably, will ever persuade either China or Japan that Russia is not awaiting an opportunity to gain euch a position in Corea a will give her the command of Enstern waters. 'I'o Rus-therefore, the present i or acceptable, for, as long as the Per sula is not Chinese soil, less ostensible cause for rupture between the Government and a exists. Japan has avy serious claims to suzerainty over Cores, and her interest in its integrity may be regarded as simply self-dote sive. But the position of China wholly different, and bad she but acted consistently with her claims one groat clement of danger at the present moment would have been rendered impossible, China has all along asserted that Corea is her vassal State, and has acknowledged it as her bounden daty to protect Corea from all dangers that might threaten it, whether from withinorfrom without. Butshoappearsto have been contented with these measures, and to lave thought that the more assertion of her intention to protect Corea would be sufficient to frighten every other Power away. Well, on that point she tas been uud 1d; and instead of repairing her mistake, has aggravated it by depriving herself of a considerable portion of her right and power to protect Corea by agreeing with Count Ito never to send soldiers there before she has commuuited her intention, in writing, to Japan! Is this the act of a suzerain Corea has little cause to thank her traditional protector. Inconsistency is the keynote of China's policy, and we now see in what a dilemma Ul nCon= sistency and infirmity of purpose have landed her. We have always condemned as visionary, unreal, and vague, the Chinese claims to suzerainty over Corea, and the present situation proves that we right. Had those claims to suzerainty been solid, and had they been consistently carried out, we should have seen a very different state of affairs to-day from that which actually exists. Japan, when she incorporated her old possession of Liuchiu, relieved the King of his duties, made him one of the senior Dakes of the Empire, and sent a Japanese Governor to administer the territory. That was, at least, cousistent. China should have done likewise.
Seeing that her claims to suzerainty over Corea were unconsidered and derided, she should, for the sake of consistency, have removed the King, and sent a Chinese Viceroy to Seoul to govern the country in the name of the Emperor of China, In that case, an invasion of Corea would have been tantamount to an invasion of the Bighteen Provinces, asd no European Power would have lightly undertaken an enterprise of such dimousious and fraught with consequences of such magnitude, Bat ig just what China has not done; on the contrary, she has actually stripped herself of some of the power to which she form-orly laid claim; and the result is Unt Corea is not so well protected as eho was before—which means that one of the outposts of China itself has weakened by Chins own aot, If China regarded Corea as one of the defences of the Empiressa buffer, 80 to speak, much as she lias regarded the States of Burma, Siam, and Aunam—it was surely her interest to have strengthened it, rather than to have left it, as she has done, very much to its own resources, And if China bad followed ap bor claims to suzerainty over Corea by incorporating it with the Empire, instead of encouraging the King to make sham Troaties with European Powers, we do not suppose that any serious obstacle would have been placed in the way of hor doing so. But this curse of inconsistency has rau through everything that she has done, and (he consequences that are now threatening her are no more than she might have foreseen, The trouble may not come this year or even next, although in our belief it is not far off 5 bat that so unsatisfactory an arrangement as now exists must bring about its natural result, and that that result be prejudicial to the peace of China, must, we think, be plain enough to all who have followed the course of events during the past three years.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.