Werrta, on the 22nd May, upon the politionl relations of France and China, we warned our readers that it might yet bern long time before the dispute was finally dismissed. Now that the first outbreak of jubilation at the conclusion of @ Preliminary Convention between France and China has received xpreasion,"—such were our words may be well to consider future 3 in a somewhat calmer A crisis ins passed; the crisis has yat to.come." And'again, on the 9th Jane; "A conviction that the quarrel between Franco and China is yet by no means set finally at rest in becoming very strong more intelligent Chinese, predicted, "oan be permanent which is built' upon so unsatisfactory 'a basis; and," we eon. eluded, 7 still luck forward to sovéril crises, situations, and even temporary deadlocks, before the final and Gotaiied Treaty la carried through." Po-day wo'are unhappily in a position to oliiim the exact fulfilment of every of these forebodings, and to point to the grounds on which we based them aa those which have actually brought about the present complication. That the Prelimiuary Convention was an unsatisfactory document may be held foa proved by the fuct that so serious n ter has arisen, according to the tion of the Chinese, out of the ambiguous wording of one of its most important clauses, Whnc with "this nunviguiry, avd "the informal nature of the Meworandam by which Captain Fournier attempted to counteract its the conflicting accounts of ged at that last interview between Captain' Fournier and Li Ohiitig-tang, and the still more contradiotory versions of the affair at or near. Longean; itis by no moans an easy task to'arrive at a clear view of the events of the Inst two month Nothing, at the first blash, could. be more reasonable, more moderate, more presumptively veracious than the Memorandum in which the Tsung. li Yamen sets forth the Chinese cor tantion-. The. Fronch; they sny—nu here it is impossible not to praise the) marked courtesy of the expressions uséd—the Fretiob, acting on a misunderstanding of the Li-Fournier arrange. mont, prematurely demanded " the evacuation of certain positions, and prematurely enforced their requisition by avi act of war. Certainly, says the Yamen, it cannot be thatthe French lave-purposely. picked a quarrel with us.°Were'it not that, with the Chiese, diplomacy so often dorisists of duplicity, and fair words are go often used to cover perfidious acts, we should. not hesitate to say that this Memorandum of the'Yaméu's is oalcalated, to' damage the cause of France in the eyes of impartial. observers, The question, however, is—Are the. facts correct. ly stated? Well, it is to be presumed that, whether the foot correctly stated or of, they are not fully stated; that some have been suppressed that many of the advices sent to both the provincial and metropolitan authores fom Tonquin daring the campaign there were utterly and cynically false and that, after all, it is impossible to found a just judgment upon what at best an ex parte statement. But what lave the French to say? They, too, tell their story, which differs toto celo from that of the Chinese, Is the French version completely andaccarately tre, and the Chinese version entirely and irredeemably false? There are few, we think, who would answer both these questions unhesitatingly in the affirmative, Regret is felt at the amount of reticence which the French have a strong oon. viction is growing up in the publi mind that the history of the Longsan et to be written, and there icion that when it is written the diarister which has led to all this trouble will be shown to have arisen partly, at any rate, from misunder-studing. We do not by.any means say that such is sure to be the en Bat we do say that the French can: has suffered in popular estimation from the reticence which the French authorities huve observed throughout the whole business, and the vacillating character of their policy. The mere fact that they first based their claims upon the document presented to Chung.
fang by Captain Fournier ap the dates on which certain were to be evacuated; ana" thei quisling this, fell back upon the immediate went" in the Preliry Convention, has staggered not a fow of those who sympathise with them. Nor has the procrastination of their diplomacy helped them very much, Yo present an Ultimatum: then to stultify that Ultimatum the next day by opening negotiations: then to tel graph to Paris for an extension, and, in spite of the refusal of M. Ferry, to continue the wearisome parley: then to name another day for the very last utterance of all, while meantime the Chinese have been temporising, retract. ing or denying their words, coming to an understanding in conversation and then writing down something quite different on paper,—all this seems to have been so much waste of time. The -native military - authorities have of course taken advantage of the delay to mobilise their troops, fortify their us, and streng! themselves generally at the expense. of. France. Had the French presented a real instead of a fictitious Ultimatum, broken off intercourse with the Chinese until they received a reply to it of Yes or No, and then quietly taken the Woosung forts and held. them, the probability is that the matter would have been now on the high-road to a pacific tlement. But the French have not acted with that foresight' and promptitude which uenally characterise their policy in a crisis of this nature, and the resalt hitherto has been deplorable, TRE FRONTIERS OF CHINA, Ie there were no other reason for wishing, on behalf of China, that she might soon come to an amicable arrange. ment with France, we should find one in the embarrassments which threaten her from other quarters, There can be no doubt that the rulers of this country Lave very cogent grounds for looking to the integrity of their own frontiers, Apart from their untenable claims to suzerainty over other states, it is evi-dont that, could such suzerainty be only acknowledged and respected, China would be very safely hedged in.on several sider, Burmah and the Shans would protect Ler in one direction, Ton" quin in another, and Corea in a third, 'These petty states would act as buffers between the Eighteen Provinces and th outer world, or rather, an the, ontposta or fortifications of Ohina Proper, and it is difficult to deny thatin the to lordship over such states put forward' by the Chinese Government.there may be as much of policy as of pride. Now glance at the map will be aufiiciont to show that, bad China been able uphold her alleged rights of eu over these defensive.outworks. would be in @ stronger position than she actually occupies to-day. Bat in, her failure to make these pretension good she sees, and sees rightly, a di rivet loss of power to resist encroach. ments on the north west. and.. cently, a step has been taken by Rassia which I doubtless caused much une the Imperial Government! appointment of a Ru General to the Amoor, with power over all that stretch of country bordered by Vsitsibar on the south, Kirin and the'! and the Sea of, artery on the enst, inolading, too, the island of Saghalien, and actually touohing Corea at its most northern poi It would be idle to pretend that thia reorganisation of the Anmoor lias no interest for Obi It shows that the Rassian Government intends to develop; the territory; to ins it' an. impor! part of Asiatic Russia, and to use ithas 8 falohram' for' farther operations, pretexts for which will not be difficult find. Even at the present moment,'
country immediately' to the south of the Russian frontier and north of Obibli is said to b erionsly disturb. ed al Supposing. that the present: Euporor wore ever compelled to imitate Hien Feng, and'leave the Capital on a banting-expedition to. escape from threate ig danger, it is very doubtful whether even Jehole would'sfford: him a safe asylum, It is almost too to hope that China' will' rem molested on the north, given t elements of trouble—a resolute and ausorapulous Power ou'her borders; and
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.