Tay reported decision ofthe French the river open diogast disappoint,, wany Frenchmen. It is no secret that several Is of rank and respectability have Fogretted most deeply the operations of Admiral Goatbet in, Formosa and Foochow, and: have gone so far as to state that Lad the French proceeded north: immediately after the failure. of negotiations between M. Patsnotre and Tebng Kuoob'tian the affair would have been settled long ago, and probs ably with bat little bloodshed. The events of the last three months have fully. justified this opinion, It was evidently the belief of the French Government that the blockade of the ports would bring the Chinese once, and also that the cap. tare of the whole Island would prove a more naval promenade. Bat on both points they have been rudely undeceived. The Chi 0 fat. from being flustered and brough! the pees of Form to be a task far beyond the present power of the French, for they have not troops in Tonquin, and. the renewed efforts of the Chinese Government to oust them from their positions in that country, unsuccessful though such attempts may be, necessitate the presence of mon-of-war and the sending out of reinforcements whioh would otherwise be of service in Formosa; and the nataral result of all this seems tobe a radical change in the French programme, It would take a large army to hold Ton. quin, capture Formosa, and march upon Poking, and the expenditare necessary to carry out such a portentous is, we should think, scarcely find favour with ti The reason assig newspapers for this reported change of plan conn scarcely fail to provoke. a gentle laugh, It is clear to the French Premier, we are told, that by the time the French army teached the Capital there would be no Government with whioh to deal; and then what would the army, do? Well, it is not our b ness to suggest an answer; but it seems 8 little curious that. the difficulty did not occur to the -Miuisterial mind early enough to prevent the programme being arranged in the first instance, It might: be, judging from the mis. carriage of French calculations respeot—ing the effect of their exploits in For-moss and Foochow, that s similar surprise would await them in Peking; and that, after all, it would be more practical, and great deal less expen-to confine their strength to hold-obtained already.
resolve la @ prudent not for us to diepate; only, let us be in apportioning our raillery. The ese have been bitterly n led for their bombastic threats, and for menace ing many reprisals that they have not been able to carry out. The French have struck many blows, with sonrosly a perceptible result: the one blow, which was to crush the hostile power beyond redemption, and which has been threatened repeatedly for mouths, i is now not to be struck at all, being the present state thoee places where they have sneopeded 1 8 certain foot-hold. " And we think it can be shown that that position is such as to explain, though scarcely, perhaps, to justify, the change of programme with which the Govern. ment is credited by its official ergs It must be generally conceded that there was but little wisdom in select. ing the northern extremity of Formosa as @ basis of operations. usefal ness of Keolang as a con arbour no doubt influenced the French authoing possession of it as a stops but that usefulness e, been somewhat exaggerated, and is more or less neutralised stages which can scarcely have been anticipated when the plan of operations was first framed. The hospitable, and decidedly prejudicial to health, The northeasterly monsoon is felt in ite fall force, raising constant rue and rendering the approach to dangers the rain is incessant for days together, and comes down like an ava. lanohe; the surrounding ovuntry is malarious, and there is no disguising the fuct that the French troops hay suffered very severely. Add to all thi that the rond from Keelung to Tamsui is' of such of ® nature as to seriously increase the difficulty of capturing the latter place, and it is established, we rik, that the policy which selected northern end. of the Island was a mi one. In the south, on the thing would have been the winter, is like that of the Mediterranean; there are bright blue skies, ing invigorating an Fu, which the seat of Governuient, the French Aduiral would have found himself in 8 position infinitely. stronger than th one he oooupies at present; his sick-would have been greatly curtailed, there would Lave been probably no deaths from cholera, or dysentery, or fever, and the headquarters of ad tration would lave long ago fallen his hands, The contrast between thi and the position he actually holds is certainly startling enough, and it is not difficult to trace some connection between the dreary result of his three months' sojourn at Keelung and the change of programme that we have referred to, Even the blockade has been unfruitfal of results; and if it be true, us is reported in this Settlement, that june Inden with Formosan produce have been arriving lately at Amoy, we have a pretty clear proof that the blockade is ineffective, and consequently invalid according to inter national law. With regard to matters the outlook is even more 1g—The promenade so lightly undertaken two years ago has long sives developed into an arduous and expensive military campaign, in which France has lost many soldiers nnd can only hold the advantages already gained at the cost of formidable reinforcements, And it ig just these reinforcements that are so difficult to obtain, "At the present moment," says Captain Norwian, in his recently published work, "there is not a battalion in the French army which could put 150 bayonets into line of battle, whilst the proportion of reliable non-commissioned officers each one could furnish is far less, I have been assured," he adds, "by a French officer of experience and distinct. tion, thi order to put a complete division into the field, it would be necessary not only to cull out all the men of the aclive army now at their homes, and all mon of the reserve that are borne on the rolls of the mobilised regiments, but also to demand 4,000 volunteer privates and at least 300 nor commissioned officore, together wi a very strong contingent of officer The adverse opinion of General Cam-benton respecting a colonial war quoted with considerable effect, and stress is Inid upon the disndvantnge under which yoluutoora labour in being imported into regiment of regulars, The battalions recently despatched to Tonquin ur composed of volanteora from every district in France; one corps has been brought to a warestrongth by transfers from no fewer than five regiments of the line and one. regiment of Zouaves; and the economy which limits the number of officers to fire per com. pany of 500 men has resulted in slack discipline "Little," remarks Captain Norman, "can be expected from batta" lions with non-commissioned officers drawn from six different corps, and with men strange to their lenders and comrades, Unfortunately for France, the constitution of its army is such that it cannot pat one complete batta. lion in the field, and it is obliged to have recourse to n system which, if any disaster arises in Tonquin, may lead to grave national disturbance." It must indeed be plain to everybody that the heavy expenditure of ihe Republic in its colonial enterprises, and its mabi to place 5,000 men in the field ithout—to borrow the expression of the came writer—drawing reservists from their firesides, may prove sufficient to cause a sudden revulsion of feeling that will seriously shake the Government, Yet these reservists must be called upon if measures are to be adopted,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.