15th Jan. THE palpi crisis in Japan has arisen out of the insufficiency of the Constitution promulgated on the 11th of February, 1889. "Up to that date Japan was an autocracy, but the Emperor then declared that in consideration of the progressive tendency of the course of human affairs and in parallel with the advance in civilisation the time had come to give his subjects a wider range of action in giving him their support. "We doubt not," he said, " that our subjects will be guided by our views, and. will sympathise with: all our endeavours, and that, harmoniously ce-operating toge~ ther, they will share with us our hope of making manifest the glory of our country, both at home and abroad, and of securing forever the stability of the work bequeathed to us by our Imperial ancestors." But the Emperor did not propose to divest himself of the government while granting representative institutions. He added:—*'The rights of sovereignty of the State we have in-hented from our ancestors, and we shall bequeath them to our descendants. Neither we nor they shall in future fail to wield them, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution hereby granted." Iv accordance with these ideas the Constitution of Japan is mo-{delled on the Prussian, and not on the english plan. In theory in England, and in practice in Prussia, the Ministers of the Crown are appointed by, and responsible to the Crown, and this is what is contemplated by the Constitution of Japan. In England the Miuisters are practically designated by, and responsible to, the House of Commons. In the event of an acute difference between the House of Commons and the Crown in England, the former has the last source of refusing to pass the Budget and of so stopping the supplies; but the House of Representatives in Japan is not entrusted with this weapon. "When the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the government shall carry out the Budget of the preceding year."
The idea of those who framed the Constitution of Japan seems to have been that the Diet should, as we have said before, be something like the Lefe should discuss the Budget, propose islative Council in a Crown Colony.
new laws and discuss those proposed by the government, but the final power was still to reside in the Emperor and his government. It was supposed that feces the government would always ave a majority, whereas with a constitution like the English, it is the majority that has its government. The Diet that has just been dissolved wanted to carry things on on the English system. They opposed the Budget almost en bloc, they opposed the measures introduced by the government, they wanted, in fact, as the House of Commons at Westminster would do, to turn out the government, and force the Emperor to choose new Ministers from their side of the House; in fact, to introduce party government, which is the necessary completion of representative institution. The Ministers of the Crown, however, the Japan Mail tells us, are "pledged in the interests of the country to resist the immediate introduction of government by party," but they "cannot govern smoothly if they find themselves perpetually confronted by a hostile majority in the House Representatives." Failing the resignation of the Ministers, who are, however, by the Constitution only responsible to the Emperor, the only course open was to dissolve the House of Represeutatives, and hope that the country atthe coming election will return a govern ment majority. If the Japan Mail is to be relied one, this is very improbable. The government is so uipopular in the country, that the Opposition regards "the suffix yo-yd, or governmental, as quite sufficient in itself to impart a discreditable meaning to the word it qualifies." Meanwhile the Mail complains that the government is not bestirring itself to get a majority of government candidates returned. Everything should be on their side. They have shown their capacity to rule; "as Viscount Kabayama justly said, when ther they be called Sat-cho officials or by any other name, it is beyond question that they have steered the country safely and peacefully through crises of unexampled gravity." Unless they are prepared, and they profess not to be prepared, to see party government established, they wast organise parliamentary support, and they could find plenty of Home Ministers in Europe or politicians in the United States, to show them how government majorities are secured at popular elections. If they do not take the trouble to do this, they must be prepared to resign their offices when the Diet meets again, and let it "be proved whether the untested agitators grouped under the banners of the Kai-shinto and the Jiyuto are more competent administrators or wiser statesmen than the proved veterans whom they seek to displace." Or the Emperor may follow the example of the King of Denmark, who has been governing for fifteen years or more without a Budget, because his Ministers are in a permanent minority. in the Folkething, his personal popularity being strong enough to prevent a revolution. When the Constitution was granted, the admirers of Japan announced with one voice that the country was ripe for representative institutions. It seems that the country was ripe enough to wait them even more completely than the framers of the Constitution desired, and the consequence is the struggle that is now agitating the country. The best thing for the country would be that the Ministers should make a' good fight for it, accept their dismissal if they are in a minority in the new House, and allow the Opposition to try their hands in turn at governing. The Euglish party system will not be found a bad one to follow.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.