following ace the most important as regards the relations between and Germany, in a speech of the Prince in Reichstag on the 11th January iduous had been their endeavours to bring about a recon. ciliate. n with France after the French war.
Whether those efforts were quite a+ success-Exst, Prince Binnarck He hi do not apeak at all of Italy or England, because there is no reason why we should not mutually entertain—we for them and they for us—the most kindly fe Between us and France the reconciliation in dificult, because of the long historical controversy in regard to the boundary which has been in dispute ever since France became a homogen jo kingdom with definite limits.
done everything we could t ince France to let except the single matter of get slice of the Rhine Proviue 10 more reason for attacking France than we have an intention of doing ay. The idea of commencing war now because at later day the prospects might not be so good ferus has never entered my mind. Ju 1867 I was opposed to pushing the Luxembourg question into a war; and, although in 1870 we were more successful We could have been three yours be-I was against going to war, because Louis Napoleon might have died, in which case all the calamities of that campaign would have been avoided, If the French were to remain at pence with us until we attacked them, then pence would be xasured for ever. What should ance? More land, forsooth ly say that in 1871 I was for istic frontier and againat the taking of Metz; but I was overruled by the military autho-ities, who argued that in the next war this fortress would be equal to 100,000 men, and I then gave in, And now, gottlemen, you are confronted again with the same question, whether in the event of war with Franco within the next seven years you wish to be weaker by another 100,000 not. For this uumber of extra men would about seven sears by an annual recruiting levy of 16,000, and it wontd be all the sane whether you anid to the Frouch, "Clu be quiet, and we will give you Metz," or you refused the reinforcements which we demand of you. Meanwhile those in France who wish to fight with us a keeping penseztoujours and that is atill the nature of the situation in France. Phere they only apeak of their fear of being wi tacked by Gecmany. But this appretieusion is real, and whoever expresses it in Krance knows that he is uttering shall not assail France, perpetual fanning of the feu to me in the highest degree periluu MBL. Goblet and Flourens clu nut dosice Ley desire to live poacefulry with us, as MIN, de Freycinet and Ferry did, All these gentlemen are friendly as long na they are at the helm; and if rheic rule could be guaranteed for any length of time I should advise you to save the money ded by this Bill, and whi cie we way ud. But as fidence in the the feelings towards us of th maj Frenehin cannot Iull me into security a8 to lead my to say we have no longer any occasion to fear " war with France, cousiction is that such a war is to be feared, by way of an attack upon France; what Ido nct know is whet! will come in ten days or ten years, dies not depend upon me, but upyi ion of the Government which is at moment at the helm of the French Republic.
When the last De Freycinet fell, who hind any iden of such an twenty-four hours beforehand? I had not, and who here knows who may be French Premier a week or w fortnight We only know how great is the ion of Feench Parliamei pacific Ministry was quite po:
dis possible any dey. No peaceful assurances can satisfy us in this respect.
No French Ministry had as yet dared openly to declare that it completely renounced its claims on Strasburg and Alsace-Lorraine, because it knew th it would at once be overthrown. The bility of a French attack, whi today was not imminent, would recur a nas Feauce thought she was stronger germany, either by alliance-e or by being better armed, and they must be pro-pated for such contingencies, It would ido to under-estimate the strength of ce.' France," said Prince Bismarck, "ig a great and powerful country, as power: tulas we. France has a warlike people, and brave people, and at all times has veavsnod skilful generals, It is an accident that the French have succumbed to us, You under-estimate the French in a most mistaken way, and it would be ya any that Peance might at once be as beaten if she were opposed to u tersing to te chances of Germany being defeated by France, the Chancellor averred that this was quite possible now that Feanes hind doubled her army and tripled her reserves, and nlwaya granted what the Government wanted in the shape of mili-Prince Bismarck then de-its to Germany of her detent by France, and went on to act forth Who vertible responsibility that would be me curred by the Reichstag in rejecting a measure calculated to avert the dangers and horrors refereed lo.
later to rectify an omi as he explained, the plenitude of natter had betrayed him, Prince ise cie sin which from Feauoe so clear as I intended, mentioned only the cage that a French Government might be called to the helm convinced of being far superior to us in preparations and strength as to be aura of victury—as con-vinyed, at leant, as the Feouch army was in 1870. But L'omitted another case in which such certainty of victory is not at all absolutely necessary, and which I wished to m cave which also occu pretty wide field in tke conjectures that we must make if we wish to be prepared for all. Lniean the case which aotiiully happened under Napoleon 11L—that enterprises nbrond wore Lo serve a8 w safety-valve for internal affairs, This would be p especially if a Govern joe should be called to ary dictn= hip, but a Gove: t which "should We do not know whether, it we attend to home questions only, we shall be able to hold our ground; but if we succeed in kindling " popular war we have almuye the TE conquered, it is no worse than if we are compelled to resign j.aud then we have at least the whole power of French patriotism stakes the part even ent, and which is kindled when Keancs is ut war, If Napoleon ILL, not compelled in any way from abroad, tudertook the campaign of 1870 against tus—a great and dificult war, which coat hima his throne—simply because he believed that it would strengthen his Government at home, why should not General Bou! ger, fur instance, if he came to the helm, attempt to do the same? I should not even call it a cums in hin on accuse him of following personal in" stiners, I should always assume what 1 presuppose of every French officer, and also, of course, of every German officer, that he believed himself to be serving his Fatherland better so than if he did not do 80, Lahould not blame him personally, But that cannot keep us from preparing on also for the contingency of France, not believing himself stronger than we, but yet turning to account the chance a Government's ability to hold its ground by war, when it cou d not do so by peace. Napoleon did that—why should hot his successors? If we think a military dictatorship possible in France, and it has existed often, why should it not be a0?
Referring to the dissolution of the Reichstag, threatened if the Army
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.