The Archive · 1890

The Chungking Convention

24th Dee

Ir is pleasant to see that the home papersaretaking a much more intelligent interest in commercial relations between Great Britain and China than they formerly did. We reprint to-day from Fairplay an article on what it calls "he Uhinese Puzzle Again", meaning thereby the Chungking Convention; where the puzzle really is, not how the Chinese came to offer such terms, but how a British Minister and the British Foreign Office came to accept them. That the Chinese should offer such terms was perfectly natural; the Szechuan authorities wanted to keep steamers away, and they have succeeded in doing it, while Sir John Walsham probably accepted them because he did not want to be bothered with the Poreisg Ofice would regard the opening question any longer, and thought the

of the port in some way or other as an equivalent for the surrender of the right to run steamers to it.

We pointed out when the Chungking Convention was first made public, how cleverly the Chinese had inserted the words "and back" in the fifth clause "As soon as Chinese steamers shall convey cargo to Chungking and back, British steamers may proceed to Chung-

Chefoo Convention said:—" When king on the same footing." The be a steamers have succeeded in ascending the river so far," etc, Now, as we mentioned before, there are wide and long stretches of smooth water above the rapids, where steamers can be run with ease and profit, and if at any time the provincial authorities had made up their minds to get up a steamer or two, the mere fact of their getting up would, under the Chefoo Convention as interpreted by the 'T'sung-li Yamen, have opened the river. The astute Chinese set themselves to circumvent this, and they have done it in the Chungking Convention. They may now take as many steamers as they like up the river; but until they send one back, they are safe from the irruption of barbarian steamers. Nor is this all the precaution they have taken: it is also stipulated that the Chinese steamers must go there and back with cargo, though probably if they once sent a steamer back, this stipulation would not hold water long.

That our authorities should have accepted such a clause as this, appar ently without any consideration of its full bearing, makes us doubt whether our diplomatists draft themselves our treaties with Chinese, or whether, out of a culpable complaisance or indifference, they accept the wording offered them by the astuter Chinese. We can hardly imagine our Minister accepting such a serious variation in the terms of the Chefoo Convention, if the full effect of it was brought to his notice at the time, as it must have been if he had drafted the clause himself. We can understand how the matter presented itself to Sir Thomas Wade, when he made the Chefoo Convention. He probably said that Great Britain wanted Chungking opened, to which Li or his deputies replied that the river thereto was not navigable. Io this Sir Thomas no doubt responded that when it was proved that steamers could go safely through the rapids, the port should be opened, and so it was settled. The new agreement is a very different thing. AS far as cargo is concerned, it is up stream that it will be so advantageous to have steamers, for junks can come down stream with ease nearly as quickly as steamers will be able to do, and by the clause as agreed to by Sir John Walsham and the Foreign Office, steamers could go on for years, taking cargo up, and coming down in ballast, without opening the river to British steamers, Such a provision must have been drafted by the Chinese, and agreed to without thought of all it implies by the British negotiators.

We cannot believe with Fairplay that the cunning wording of this clause deceived even Sir Robert Hart." Sir Robert Hart is in an exceedingly difficult position at Peking, a position which he could not possibly keep ithe were not far too clever to be deceived by such a clause as this. He is the deservedly highly-paid and faithful servant of the Chinese, and though the Foreign Mi-ulsters are in the habit of flying to him for assistance when they are in any difficulty with the Tsungli Yamen, instead of relying on themselves, they must surely recognise that his first duty is to the Chinese. He does that duty, we know, with a constant eye to keeping China in the path of progress, and to extending the relations between China and foreign Powers, but when the Chinese have made up their minds on certain limits which they will not pass, he has to carry out their decision. Even if he sees that the minister of his own country is aking a mistake, he cannot, in justice to his employers, point it out. He is much too clever not to see it. The result in the present instance is, that we have a port opened, or about to be opened, which takes longer to reach from Shanghai than London or New York, and which will remain so practically isolated until a really enlightened man is sent up as Viceroy of Szechuan.

Up till 1890 the rapids and rocks in the Upper Yangtze have sufficed to keep western China unsullied by barbarian traders; but the opportunity is there, andthe foreigners have determined to exploit it. From this side only a very lame success has been now achieved, but it is being attacked vigorously from Burma an from longking. There is a most laudable rivalry now between the French and the English on the southern and south-western frontiers of the empire to secure the trade of the great provinces that have been so Jong almost untouched. Burma and tongking are each carrying their railways to the frontier, and before long we shall hear of preparations to open a custom house on the Burmese frontier, as has been done at Lungchow and Méngtea. The spread of trade is certain and the flood as it rises, if it cannot sweep away such as obstacle as the Chungking Conven+ tion, works round it.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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