30th Dee.
[communicatep.]
Mucit has been written of late about the desirability of remaining on of amity with China; and C usefulness as an ally has been put forward asa plea for and in explanation of the British Government's policy of forbearance and leniency in regard to the recent anti-foreign outbreaks, Io a plain, unlettered man, not given to dabble in politics, all this appears strange and inexplicable. Firstly, it is taken for granted that China would prove a useful ally to Britain, in case of war arising with, I infer, Russia, the only Power in Asia whose interests are likely to clash with England's and from whom she may have any real cause for fear. Secondly, it is assumed that by non-intervention China's good will may be retained.
The first assumption pre-supposes exit on the Pacific she so ardently longs that as a military state China posses-for, and would give an impetus to Russes great offensive power. 'I'he truth is sian trade. England naturally would that in power of offence she is egret not regard such acquisition with inviously deficient. In passive defence difference. But the keeping of Rus-and the difficulty of being dealt an sia out of Corea is infinitely more effectual blow alone lie her strength.
China's affair than England's, Even It is self-evident that it is only in Japan ought to be more zealous than protecting the north Indian frontier England of safeguarding the Hermit that she could render Great Britain any Kingdom. It is very clear the Manchu real service, whereas Britain could aid dynasty cannot passively view an inva-China in warding off invasion from sion of the peninsula, For, were Russia Kashgaria, Ili, Corea, and her entire to occupy it, Manchuria would be almost: coast line. It is beyond question that untenable, and Peking would be within a strong Chinese force acting from easy striking distance.
Kashgar as a base would prove a The second assumption requires but menace to a Russian army marching on a@ short answer. It presupposes that India, and would require the diversion reprisals or acts of punishment would of a certain portion of that force to alienate China and perhaps throw her secure its fi Were the troops ocinto the arms of Russia. Oriental cupying Kashgaria and Ili efficient, wall equipped and well officered, this nations do not bear affection; they Fespect or they despise. They respect would be undeniable. But the reverse the strong and sagacious and despise is the case. Ihe miserable condition the weak and gullible. If it be to of the small Chinese army in that China's advantage to join Great Britain quarter, and the difficulties of trans-in the hour of mutual danger, she is ferring troops and materiel through wise enough to do it. If she is not Kansu and across the desert have threatened, she will stand aloof. It is been recorded by English officers. China, of no use to expect or attempt to though vast in resources, would not exact more. be able to place a small army corps, Ibis evidently then China's interest almost worthless as it would be, on to remain on amicable terms with Eng-the field of action in time to effect laud. It is China's interest to strengthen anything important. It would require her power of defence against the great at least one year to transport troops Northern Power. It is England's in-from Canton or Chihli to the theatre terest that China should clearly realise war, and in the meantime either the small advantage to Great Britain British' supremacy in India would have to be derived from an alliance with bees upset or the Russian attack her. Conciliation no doubt is desirable; repelled. But of the semi-drilled troops but it is China who stands in need of in these two provinces probably not a England's friendship, not England who single man would be moved from China requires China's. It were better for Proper. It is probable Russia would both empires did they recognise this make a diversion in the north, and all fact. the available forces would be retained Finally, England cannot fail to lose for the defence of the Capital. he esteem if she continue to sacrifice the invasion of India will not be undertaken interests of her subjects for the sake of with an army of less than a quarter of retaining a very dubious friendship. million of men, and the detachment This then is the plea for not avengiuy from that body of ten thousand, or even grievous wrongs inflicted on peaceful a swaller force, would be able tu effec-men and defenceless women. Our foretually check any move on the part of; fathers would blush to think that their China in Kashgaria. If England cannot descendants were so mercenary as to herself defend India then, China will! accept money as an atonement for never enable her to do so. England blood and the price of outrage. We has no lack of fighting material. India are returning again to the equity of possesses enormous resources in this the barbarians. Well might that mighty respect; and, as to martial qualities orator exclaim, did he now live, "But and physique, Chinese are inferior to the age of chivalry is gone. That of Sills. "England must depend on her sophisters, economists, and calculators just rule and the loyalty of her subjects, has succeeded, and the glory of Europe to keep Russia out of India. On the other hand, how much greater would the benefit be to China, were a Russian army marching on Kashgaria or Ili, if an Indian force were to sally forth from the northern outlets and threaten the Muascovite Hank.
Again, that Russia is desirous of known, Adios the naval station obtaining possession of Corea is well of the Russian Pacific Squadron, and the future terminus of the Great Siberian Railroad, is practically ice-bound for four mouths of the year. The possession of the several fine seaports in-Corea would supply Russia with the is extinguished for ever."
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.