Tore are three destinies waiting for this unhappy country, according to the Spectator, and itis extremely difficult to tell what the fate of China is to be, "The greatest experts in Chinese affairs, which are the affairs of a fourth of the human race, confess that they are without some of the necessary data for judgment, and confine themselves to hinting at opinions which, when understood, are found to be singularly conflicting." In the first place, however, before coming to the three destinies, the Spectator asks if it is impossible for Peking to collect or hire army and make conquests with it as Kien Lung did three hundred eats ago. This is a mythical Kien ung; the real 6ne reigned from 1736 to 1796, or little more than one hundred years ago, 'I'here are still fighting men left in China, the Spectator opines, and it is not certain if the Chinese 64) will for any length of time tolerate Buropsan rulers, if they will consent to have their Empire split up into separate States, or whether each State as it. becomes strong will seek to reunite the ancient Empire. "It is therefore most difficult, indeed impossible, to give more than an impression, as to the fate of China, which impression, being in some sense a prophecy, will in all human probability prove erroneous, Still, we give it because the subject li one of keen interest, because it is the result of much observation through a long period of years, and because it differs radically in one important respect from the impressions now prevailing in this country. We think ove of three future conditions for China very probable, though their development may take place very slowly."
The first is, the entire absorption of China by Russia. We are glad to sea that the Spectator is not led away by the absurd idea that Russia requires China asa field for the expansion. of her vast population—the irresistible glacier theory. Russia wants China because she regards it as a rich country in which she cav recover some of the millions lost in Bastern Siberia, and" asa recruiting-ground from which she may procure a population for Siberia. Ruasians are supposed to govern Asiatics more easily than we do, because they are mentally closer to them. " Russia can, in fact, govern China more easily than we govern India, because the necessary provision of troops is not ao difficult to her, and as Northern Asia yields her no-revenue she has every temptation to make the attempt, Europe, for European reasons, will not fight her; and if she could bribe Japan with the Philippines, or possibly even with Corea, Europe could not fight her in Chinese water." There ise good deal of loose writing in this, Russia has to bring her troops for China from Odessa, England from Caloutts, so that it is really easier for England; and it is ridiculous to say that we could not fight Russia in Chineas waters, even if she had bribed Japan, The second future condition is the removal of the Court to Hsianfu in Shensi, where the Government is to "accumulate a moderate military force of hill-men, and with them retain its loose yet despotic control over Central and Southern China. The body of the people do not cara much about Northern Chins, which must inevitably be Russian; they are accustomed to a. central dynasty; and they may go on obeying in. their half-and-half way as their fathers have done for generations." There la a story current that the Empresa Dowager has an immense private store of bullion at Peking, which is anonolly increased under the will of her late husband Hien Feng; that it is this trengure which makes her such a power in the Bwpiro; that she is beginning to be afraid that the Russians wil come down to Peking and cary off her hoard; and that she is accordingly preparing to transfer it to Heianfa, What we know from independent testimony is that the toad from Peking vid Peotingfu to Heianfu is guarded by detachments of aoldiers posted the whole. distance at intervals of about. twenty miles, the
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.