Wo are now in possession of what Mr. Chamberlain actually did say in his Birmingham speech. Reuter represented him as asserting that Grent Britain could not fight Russia in the Far East without anally. What he really asserted was that "in China we have now to count with Russia, as in Afghanistan, except that we do not possess an army or defensive frontier in China, and therefore cannot injure Rossia without an ally." The version that Reuter's agent gave of this contained a grain of truth, but, on the whole, was About as clumsy and misleading a summary as could well be conceived. Reuter apart, however, we dare say tha€ many readers of Mr. Chamberlain's words will find iticulty in apprehending their exact [significance. Why has Great Britain to Yount with Russia in China now any Smore fisan she had to count with her six Juonths ago? Port Arthur does not enter unto this.question. Its possession thons Russia's maritime potentialities by Railway is carried across Manchuria to the sea at Liaotung. Of course the completion of the railway to Viadivostock would have greatly augmented her strength, but, that was a contingency to be reckoned with in avy case. What we want to examine now is the change resulting from her acquisition of Linotung as well as of the privilege of carrying her railway thither, and we venture to affirm that there will be no change in her offensive capacity until the railway is finished, and until she has established series of depots forming a serviceable line of communications with her Caspian territories. It appears to be assumed in some quarters that Manchuria would offer to Russia a secure basis of operations against the Middle Kingdom, and even that she could march a great Manchu corps darmée to the reduction of Peking and the overthrow of the Tung dynasty. Is that a foregone conclusion? Apply the conditions of the problem to a European State, and consider whether it would be reasonable to conclude that if France, for example, yamed a foothold in Prussia, she could organise a Westphalian corps for the assault of Berlin? Patriotism is not counted an important factor in calculations that concern China, yet it is difficult to conceive the Manchu Tartars following the Russian fag to fight against a throne defended by their own countrymen and occupied by a sovereign whom their own ancestors placed there. It seems to us that many a long year must pass before Russia could attempt anything of that kind, or even before she could count upon Manchuria asa safe platform from which to aim a blow ut Peking. Decades and cycles bulk very small, however, in the history of nations, and there is no blinking the fact that when Russia has railway communication right through from Europe to Liactuny, and when she has fully utilised all the pretexts that the construction of the railway will furnish for fixing her grasp upon Manchuria, she will" stand a veritable Colossus in the Far East, 1It must have been to that time that Mr. Chamberlain was looking forward. And when that time comes will other cou have undergone no important alteration Will China'be as helpless then as shi now? 'That, in our opinion, is the crucial question. Great Britain' has immense interests in China, and only two ways of safeguarding them present themselves, an indirect way and a direct way. The indirect way is to contrive that China shall organise her land forces so as to be an effective barrier against any foreign assault upon her integrity. There is not the least doubt that her forces could be so organised. It would be necessary that they should be led by foreign officers; but if properly trained, properly equipped, and properly commanded, they could give a good account of themselves as defenders of their frontiers against any enemy. Russia appears to have foreseen that phase of the problem, for she has already manceuvres to put her own people into the posts hitherto occupied by German military experts in China. If, in' the face of recent events, Chinese statesmen are so singularly infatuated as to continue their acquiescence in arrangements of that kind, it becomes quite hopeless to think of galvanising them into any vitality of self-defence." Then there is the direct way, namely, that before the time arrives of which we are speaking, England herself may be planted in' the Yangtze valley and, perhaps, on the Peilto, and may be in 'a position to wield a Chinese army as powerful as her Indian forces. There are people who refer with bated breath to the stupendous and impossible task that would confront England in the East if she essayed to assume adininistrative control of " hundred millions, or abundred and fifty millions, of Chinese. Yet these same people find' no difficulty in crediting Russia with a digestion vigorous enough to assimilate Mnuchuria ata mouthful. It is no boast to say that if history proves anything it proves the exceptional capacity of the Anglo-Saxon race to grapple with precisely such big administrative enterprises as that which now ox-cites the apprehension of certain pessimists. When have. the Chinese. displayed qualities suggesting the impossibility of imjosing a foreign yoke upon their necks is strange that they should still be invested with any glamour of the ignofem in English eyes, England's interests do nob counsel an aggressive policy, hut unless the Middle Kingdom is to be eaten up by another Power, we appear to he driven to the conclusion that it must be rendered indigestible by one of the above means, There is always Japan's army in the background of course. Japan and England" in combination might constitute themselves China's guardians, and very efficient guardians they would be. But the experience of a great many centuries shows exactly whither such guardianship ultimately leads. Already England's protection of her Chinese interests has planted her at Weihaiwei, and neither she nor Japan will be content to champion an inert, unprogressive, and' helpless China without securing the reward of their championship. Thus we come hack to our starting point that unless Chins makes a new departure on her own account, she wi be relieved of the responsibility by Great Britain—perhaps by Great Britain and Japan in combination, one or other of which contingencies will have occurred long, before Russia develops dangerous aggressive, potentialities in' Manchuria,—Japan Mult.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.