19th July, ul In concluding our articles on this subject, we have now to consider the consequences to the community and to its future administration arising directly from the judgment given by the Court of Consuls. Those of our readers who have pursued the matter thus far will, we feel convinced, realise that although the question at issue is of a somewhat technical nature, ill-suited to discussion in hot weather, yet the public rights involved are too valuable, too dearly bought and safeguarded in the past, to allow of their being allowed to lapse for' lack of the necessary interest and united action in the matter. Let us look this judgment square in the face. Let us consider what it means, not in regard only to that much disputed piece of lawyer's land, known as U.S. Lot 112, but in regard to its inevitable results on the whole future of the Settlement. Let us, to this end, repeat once more the remarkable statement on which the Judgment itself is admittedly bas-"Tt was held by the Court of Consuls that those who framed the Land Regulations had in mind that beach-und should be surrendered to public use for roads and jetties when and where necessary and the demands of the public for them can be satisfied by no other arrangement."
Now, what does this statement, if accepted as final, imply? Tt means that either the entire extent of foreshore now subject to " public use: must revert and become the private and exclusive property of any adjoining riparian owner who may' elect to apply for a permit to fence it in for building purposes, or else that the Municipality will be forced into endless and very costly litigation in the attempt to protect, at great disadvantage, the public rights in every particular case.' It is possible that in so large a community as this there may exist'a very limited number of individuals to whom such a prospect may not be without its allurements, but we feel certain that the great majority of Ratepayers, landowners included, will regard it with dismay and do everything in their power to avoid it. It is inevitable, human nature and the value of Shanghai land being what they are, that no riparian owner, however public-spirited, would be likely to forego for any great length of time, the exercise of private rights over' foreshore land, whenever and wherever these might be legally obtainable. It is also obvious, if the judgment of, the Court of Consuls means anything, that under it certain Bund lot-holders might lay. claim, fence in and build up to high water; mark, since no road can be considered necessary thereon and since the neces-
and undisturbed. Similarly, under jetties could be left accessible this judgment, Mr. Ince could; reste occupation of the Chinese Garden foreshore—whereon neither road nor jetty exists—and cover it with godowns or Chinese tenements and so on, through a long list of dreadful possibilities, too absurd for serious contemplation, yet following logically from the dictum of the! provision' for enabling; Court of Consuls.
As we have endeavoured to show, this latest interpretation of Land Regulation VI makes the necessity for' the surrender of beach-ground dependent upon the need thereon for roads and jetties, the admission of the need being presumably left to individual opinion in each case that may arise, to be decided in manner undefined, or in other words, by process of law. As the rivers and beach-grounds in the Settlement are notoriously addicted to the habit of taking to themselves accretions, the result of the judgment would edith entail a continual removal of existing roads or their gradual exclusion from river rights. This intricate subject, however, we need not now stop to discuss. The addition of the words, "and when the demands of the public for them can be satisfied by no other arrangement," as contained in the judgment, in themselves open up a field of future litigation caleulated to keep the legal talent of Shanghai busily employed, and the public purse depleted, for many years to come. As it stands, the judgment i utterly impracticable, and we feel it therefore to be a matter of surprise that, with the Privy Council's decision as a recognised precedent, by which at least H. B. M.'s Consul-General might have been guided, the verdict comes to us with the unanimous concurrence of the Court. We are equally surprised that a matter of such urgent importance to the entire community should have been disposed of in the course of a single afterngon—for the judgment was delivered on the very day of the pleadings—and we can' only express the hope that the Court, naturally unversed in many matters of local tradition and precedent, adjudicated the question thus lightly under'a mistaken sense of its importance; which latter the pleadings failed sufficiently to emphasise. If this should prove to be the case, it is possible that.a petition to the Court fur a rehearing, trained either by the Council or by a number of Ratepayers, might afford some satis factory solution of the impossible position in which the public rights are now placed.
If this be impracticable, however, it remains for us to face the situation and to consider its future bearings. tol That, the existing local system would! before long conic to require revision and adjustment is an opinion that has for some years past been gaining ground in many quarters, and to-day some modification of the judicial' procedure appears inevitable. The constitution of the Court of Consuls, as established in 1869, is given in the following extract from a Memo-random drawn up and signed by the j Ministers of the then Treat Powers:
"In reference to the que: ion dis jeussed by the Consuls relative toa individuals to sue the Council, the undersigned sanction provisionally, and as an periment, subject to future modi tion found expedient, the third proposition brought under consideration of the Consuls in their meeting of the 13th of July, 1869, by which Court, to be Foreign Consuls" shall be at the beginning of each year by the whole body of treaty Consuls, and instructions will be given accordingly."
From this it will be observed that the Court was established as a provisional measure with view to enabling private individuals, of any of the several extraterritorialised nationalities here represented, to bring suit against the cosmopolitan Council: but the provision, like many of the rough and realy measures of those vi days, was even' then detective, and is now utterly inadequate to the objects for which it was intended. More than that, in the fact that no provision in the constitution of the for appeal to a higher tribunal, in direct antagonism to the spirit and letter of one of those Land Regulations which presumably" form the basis on which its judgments rest and afford the reason "for its existence. For under Art. XXVIT of our Code it is laid down that the! Council, as representi payers, shall enjoy which private litigants possess.
Now since every private individual sued by the Municipality either before the Supreme, or any Consular Court, enjoys the right of appeal, it is obvious that without a similar privilege, the public rights are placed in a position of great. disadvantage. The Land Regulations have' been recognised by formal act of the Powers concerned as the Charter of Shanghai's local government; they may not be altered or amended without the consent of the Diplomatic Representatives at Peking: it is, therefore, only reasonable and' equitable that when' a judgment given by the Court of Consuls entails an infringement of the public' rights contained under any specific Regulation, that judgment should, at' least, be liable to revision (where the matter is of admitted importance to the community) by the: Representatives of the Treaty' Powers." To some it
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.