Few more interesting questions will come up for settlement when. the present crisis is over than the question of the Chinese army. What is to become of it? We may at the outset state that foreign opinion respecting is is as wide as dread and contempt can make it. Headed by the Emperor of Germany, Lord Wolseley, and the late Mr. Pearson, there isa great number of Europeans who recognise in the Mongolian fight ting man a "yellow peril," while on the other hand the great majority of foreign residents in the Far East run the other extreme, and_ firmly believe that the best of Chinese troops might be discomfited by a battery of fire engines with a good supply of water. Needless to say the truth lies between the two extremes. Well-drilled, well-diseiphued, well-led, with prompt pay, a sufficient commissariat and. proper arms, the Chinese soldier is as redoubtable a foe as most troops would care to meet. We have seen a little of what, under somewhat adverse circumstances, he could do at Tientsin. There, out of the half dozen conditions we have laid down he had certainly not more than half, and yet for a time the situation of the foreign forces was to say the least precarious. Without any of them (his usual condition), he is what we know him, a shiftless, unreliable, negligible quantity, whose rank and file escape merited contempt from the fact that we all know their shortcomings are not their own fault.
There are eight known forces in the north, those of Yuan Shih-kai, generals Sung, Sun, Tung Fu-hsiang, and Nich; the Peking Field Force Yi Ko-tong's force in Manchuria: and the Mongol cavalry. Detachments of most of these were seen by Lord Charles Beresford during his visit in 1898, and it is to him that we are indebted for the most complete survey of the Chinese military. position." Nobody, not even the Peking government, knew what was the actual strength of its forces the outbreak of the Boxer trouble. An instance is given where out of a paper strength of 10,000 men, only 800 were forthcoming in the flesh. This probably is an exceptional case, but native numbers may well be divided by three, four, or five according to circumstances. Ofall the forces seen by Lord Charles, he says that Yuan Shih-kai's was " the only army complete in all details according to Buropean ideas that I found' in China." Many of the others do not lack arms of modern type and suf ficient power, as witness the damage they were able to accomplish at Tientsin, but the majority are insufficiently drilled, and very poorly disciplined. Where the German instructors had laid a good foundation, and the Russians had ousted them this was particularly apparent, so much so that every possible difficulty was placed in the way of Lord Charles's inspection. 'Tung Fu-hsiang's Kansu troops are a disorderly undisciplined rabble, but good fighting material. The same is true of the Mongolian cavalry—excellent stuff' wasted for want of training.
OF the central and southern troops we need not speak at present. Suffice it to say that much of the foregoing criticism is as applicable to them as to their northern comrades. The weakness of the Chinese is neither in his spirit, his body, nor his desire. It lies in his head. He wants brains to organise, orgamse, organise. A visitor goes to his arsenals. He finds the most modern and the most powerful machinery. Machine-shops like those of our local establishment are there, fit for comparison with the best in Europe. These are turning out the most up-to-date Mausers and machine gus, the best of ammunition that can be made, but not in very large quantity, The expenditure is immense, the output small in com-risen. Turn to another part of the works and the reason is partly ex-lained; for every rifle that is made in some of the arsenals there are three or four gingals: instead of every weapon useful for modern warfare there are being constantly supplied obsolete arms which the rest of the world has relegated to the scrap-heap. This is especially the where there is no European supervision, and where even the Chinese foremen have no accurate knowledge of the m chinery they use. No less than fourteen patterns of rifles were seen in the hands of Chinese soldiers by Lord Charles Beresford. They v from the time-honoured smooth-bore Good men can be got, as we have seen at Weihaiwei, and with thorough training, proper discipline, and good officers, make reliable soldiers. Once China has been thoroughly pacified, and her government placed on a sound basis her need of troops should be very Thoroughly law-abiding, the Chinese can easily be ruled if the rule be just. Each province would need and should have a small, well-appointed army to act as a sort of military police. Its efficiency would largely depend on its mobility. Artillery of the lightest would suffice, since there could be none brought against it excep by foreign troops, and we trust that after this the necessity of foreign troops in China will not again arise. The ideal method of raising, equipping, and ing on this force would' probably be to entrust foreign officers with its creation in the first place, and then with its training and management until such time as there should be a body of native officers fit to assume control. The number should be strictly limited to the requirements of the case, and if necessary there should be aty stipulations respecting it. It is particularly to be borne in mind that what China will need will not be forts but men. Internal security is what she must aim at, security for life, for property, and for trade. So with regard to her navy. China needs no battleships, no expensive cruisers, no complicated naval system. What she docs want in the way of fighting vessels is a swarm of torpedo boats, destroyers, and the like specially buile for her coast line and her rivers. They are not to be fitted against {Japan or any other foreign power. but against the native pirate, whose predatory instincts are too strong for his honesty. If at the moment (es cepting the war and its cause) there lis one thing which stamps the pre-
Tower musket to the newest Manser. sent regime in China as utterly Supplies of ammunition must ne-/ effete, it is the inability to put down cessarily vary in proportion, and piro Had it not been for the what the effect is in war time may police work done by the British be imagined from the fact that in the last fifty years the China Chinese officer has declared that in seas would have counted as many hor-his personal knowledge pistol am-j tors per month as the metropolitan munition has been issued to riflemen, ' province of Pechili_has lately done. while a well known British traveller: This must cease. China must'see to has seen a miscellaneous heap of it: the foreign Powers must see to it: loose cartridges thrown down together! and the key to future peace and from which the soldiers were expected ' security lies in an honest, well-train-to fit their various arms. ed, and efficient police, military and Such is the Chinese army of to-! naval. day ¢ What is to be done with it? "ripe asp ViGouR FOR THB HAIR" Like the English, it is an army of) The only article which really possesses autei volunteers. No man can be compel. {ites virtues ioo: Ted to. serve in China. Men join the nis Rowtasos Saran when out of work, tempted by the {the hair being injured by illness, and should offer of pay, and by the usually 1a: sleep de used we Childers i 3 so otter life, Probably the first thing eces- Ses imparts eh, Baal sary would be to send 90 per cent of. san Ort, and if you have never used it, the present strength about their, are strongly a/vised to procure a bottle wi business.
They are hopelessly i golden colour for fair mair. out delay, and continue using it; also ina Sold Ly Stores capable from inability and tradition. Sha Chemists
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.