25th March.
CHaNces in tactics are, like changes in everything else, mere matters of evolution. The Macedonian phalanx had its day, the Roman formations theirs, and so with others to the time of the great Napoleon, who, thanks to his tactical developments no less than to his genius, made his supple columns more than a match for the rigid lines opposed to them. It was Napoleon, we believe, who declared the necessity, if perfect military efficiency was' to be preserved, of a change of tactics every decade. Strange to say soldiers whose reputation and lives depend on their being up-to-date in matters military, are seemingly too careless or too shortsighted to see what after evident. The layman would have the event appears to have been self-
thought that in the German army there ought to have been prescience enough to have prevented the useless sacrifice of life at St. Privat, and that the British troops should have known enough about the effect of small bores and smokeless powder to have avoided the humiliation of Colenso, But it was not so. The Germans knew precisely what weaous the French possessed. They new that the chassepot was in superior to the needle-gun and that under certain circumstances the mitrailleuse was murderous. Yet they assaulted the heights just as Napoleon assaulted ~Hougomont, while Buller hammered away at the Tugela position as Massena did at that of Busaco, and with like results. There was no foresight in either case. The lesson had to be written in lines of blood before it was learned. Then the Teuton grasped his at once. An immediate order swept away the old system, and presented the world with an almost unique spectacle, the practice of a new system of tactics in the face of an enemy.
We too have learnt somethin; from South Africa, and, as in all previous cases, the change has been forced by the adoption of a new armament. Small bores, smokeless powder, and powerful artillery, these are the causes of the recent changes in tactics, and it is difficult to say which has most contributed to the new development. The flat trajectory, the rapid fire, and the long range of the rifles have been most powerful factors in the campaign now apparently soon to close. Bnt these were, to a certain extent, foreseen. What was not foreseen was the weird effect of smokeless powder. Over and over again we have read of the difficulty of locating guns in action. Shells came no one knew whence. Men were falling and nobody knew how to bit back. The best that could be done was to fire in the direction from which the sound came.
It is evident from this that one of the effects of the new developments in weapons is to give to the defence a greatly increased power. i 'A position being chosen, guns posted and carefully hidden, trenches dug without the old fashioned parapet in front which was usually an excellent object to aim at, men well under cover and well in hand, a commander can follow the example of Brer Rabbit and "lie low," as the Boers did at Colenso, so as to give to the enemy the impression that no one is there, and then at the supreme moment, when the attacking artillery has ceased to fire for fear of hitting its own men, the hitherto pent-up forces are released with startling effect. There is, however, a grave drawback to this new defensive strength. It is the danger that arises from being surrounded, for since frontal attacks are shown to be more and more suicidal, flank attacks will necessarily take their place, and these have a tendency to threaten! lines of retreat in such a way as toi make the best troops nervous. It! was fortunate for Sir George White that he had almost the stores of a! fortress to rely on at Ladysmith. Had he been surrounded, as was possible, elsewhere, a very different ending so far as he was concerned might have ensued. Major Callwell in his recent book, "The Tactics of) the Day," writes thus; "At Metz German' host enveloped Bazaine in strength only one-half greater than that of the French force which was} enclosed; but it seems not impossible that we may in the early future! find one army surrounding and blockading another numerically equal to itself and compelling a surrender," and this because when surrounded the defending army must attack to force its way out, thus handing over its previous advantage to its opponent. It was from fear of this thet the Greeks ran at Domokos, and for the same reason and no other the Boers made no stand from Bloemfontein to Pretoria.
The new weapons have immensely increased the difficulty of scouting and the collection of reliable information. Whether a position is held by fifty men or five hundred cannot possibly be found out by scouts assailed by accurate fire more than a mile away, bub whence they know not. So too the employment of cavalry in the shock tactics of olden times seems likely to be a! thing of the past, however essential horsemen may be for other purposes.
But it is perhaps on artillery that recent experience has had most} effect. When the British soldier found that the civilian Boer was handling weapons in the field which had hitherto been known as guns of} position he was not a little surprised, and his wonder was shared by his professional friends on the Continent. That was his first lesson. Another was that the old dictum as to the necessity of massing guns, that two guns might do something, but that one gun was no gun jatall, might with great advantage be ignored. This is what Major Callwell says:—"A single gun, the position of which (he enemy Is unable for some time to discover, will often effect greater havoc than a battery which is once seen and made the target of opposing guns." Pom-poms, too, appear to work best singly. The writer referred to has no very high opinion of their powers, however.
Lastly the war of the future will be a spade war. Even the attackers find it needful to run wy hasty cover if there be no natural protection at hand.
All this has been shown by the experience gained in South Africa. Tt is not likely that it would be applicable in "its entirety in a European war. But principles are principles all the world over, and it is certain that the tactics of the autumn manceuvres held in France and Germany last year are as much out of date as those of Napoleon and Wellington at Waterloo.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.