The Archive · 1902

The British Navy in the Far East

12th April.

AN important paper was contributed toa recent number of the Vineteenth Century and After by the late Lieut.-General Sir Andrew Clarke, G.C.M.G., etc, and then Agent-General for Victoria, who was an acknowledged authority on all Fastern and Australian affairs. Given the place of honour in the magazine, Sir Andrew opened with an appeal to his countrymen to give up once for all their absurd" nervousness respecting "the visionary schemes of Russia in Central Asia," and settle down to the consideration of those questions of vital importance which so frequently are slurred over. Naval power first, foremost, and always is the text of the homily Sir Andrew read to his hearers. With that at our command our position cannot suceessfally be assailed.

India, China, and the South Pacific are the areas covered by these pointed considerations. As regards the first, our critic held that from the sea, land from the sea alone can India be wrested from our hold by any outsider. He might perhaps have added that the practical impossibility of any successful attack by land was sufficiently demonstrated by the stand made by the Boers at Colenso. To the sea, therefore, he demanded that our nain effort should be directed. Years ago he pointed out the trend ut German expansion to the Far East, and the possibili of her becoming the inheritor of the Dutch Colonial Em In his more recent publication ho temin us of the strengthened position of the principal continental nations east of Suez, of Russia in Viadivostock and Port Arthur, of Germany in Kiaochow, and of France in Siam and Cochin Ubina, But he shows that our Indian position, nothwithstanding the immense growth of our interests, is as weak as ever it was, Coaling ' stations and harbours of refuge, both needed, are not yet in existence. Something has been done at Trincomalee, but only in a halfhearted and wholly inefficient way. Sir Andrew named nine points which should be looked to and provided with all possible requirements. The first of these is Aden, the last, Port Hamilton. The last could of course only become ours again, if that were desirable, on which point opinions differ, by an agreement with Corea ud Japan in face of some immediate er, or in the event of Russia's cupying any part of Corea, when our promise respecting Port Hamilton would be no longer binding.

The true foundation of our naval supre: uacy is correctly declared to be the pre-eminence of the shipping trade of the British Empire." We are familiar enough with the assertion that the navy is our first line of defence, but a little consideration, and a due appreciation of the arguments of the paper under review should suffice to convince us that, though Sir Andrew Clarke did not say so in so many words, our first line of defence is he mercantile marine. W'thout wat our grea ness would inevitably decline. As regards the navy, Sir Andrew recommended the concentration, not the dispersion of our naval strength. In the wars of the future as in the boxing days of the past, it will be the knock-out blow that will tell. Recent years have seen such development on the part of rivals, that Englishmen are beginning to enquire' somewhat closely whether the old soothing two-power doctrine is, for these times, altogether sound, and the suggested creation of an Australian marine as a first addition to the Greater Britain fleet is welcomed. " Public opinion," the writer remarked of Australia, " is extremely

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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