The Archive · 1901

The Peking and Taku Forts

13th May.

"Tne King's government must be carried on" was one of the political aphorisms of the Duke of Wellington which, under the mask of bald truism, embodied much political wisdom. Tt admitted the precedency of matters of administration to the fads of the partisan, and expressed the Duke's firm resolution, not only to suppress his own prejudices, but those of his friends and party in the stress and distress of the ship of State. He constantly acted up to it, and on more than one momentous occasion threw overboard his most cherished principles, not in order to retain office, but to meet that greatest of all exigencies, the salvation of the State. It is only very strong men who can thus stand up to the charge of inconsistency and show that their power is allied with wisdom by recognising the inevitable instead of tenaciously holding on to principle, which after all in polities is often but the misspelling of prejudice, The Ministers of the Powers in Peking last summer were caught in a death-trap, and the very unique experience they then had seems to have filled them and their Governments with a fixed resolution that under no circumstances whatever would they allow a repetition of that atrocious chapter of Manchu treachery and wickedness. Obviously this is a determination in which we all agree, though surely there is room to doubt if the special methods their Excellencies are taking to secure the end in view are the best possible, We should, before going further, like to emphasise the fact that the villainies and dangers of Peking in 1900 would in large measure have been non-existent had the Ministers shown a little more prescience, and a little more willingness to listen to the information and warnings of their lay ce-nationals. We know by experience that it is a pre~ sumption and often an impertinence of the Press to offer advice to Diplomacy, but considering that all foreigners in China are ever on the edge of a social and political vol-cane, we should have thought that all notices of internal rumblings, andah premonitions of great eruptions would be welcome, and especially when supplied by those placed most favourably to judge and observe. However much our own prognostic was despised, the data from which we made it, viz, therepor's of missionaries, were worthy of all attention. But once again, are not the Ministers following out'a policy of future defence with their eyes in a bag? and are they not by this very scheme frustrating the more urgent and important part of their policy—to rehabilitate the Imperial Government in Peking, and restore peace to distracted Northern China?

As our readers know, a section of Peking is being turned into a strong fortress, and a fortress in such proximo ity to the centre of Power that it could in a few minutes reduce the Palace to a heap of ruins. To enable this scheme to be carried out, a great number of the most important yamens and bureaux of the Imperial Government have been annexed, with the result that there will be a great displacement of the machinery Chinese administration when it comes and here is the very rub, wi ever come back? Is not this international fort a standing menace, as well as a standing hui! tion, in a country where "face" is more important than all other things put together? We hold no brief im this matter for the wretched Manchus: they deserve richly all they have received, and a good deal more, which we hope will yet befall them. Our concern is wholly with foreign interests, Are they best being conserved by the present policy? We think not. We believe the real key of the defence of the Ministers is where it was found last year, at Taku; and we would erase every fort there and every camp that lies between the Peiho mouth and the capital, and insist by treaty that they never again be remade. A garrison of 250 men in each greater Legation, such as was originally prepoeat with strong barracks and a few guns, would be sufficient for every emergency in Peking if the road up was clear. If it be necessary to have a foreign garrison of magnitude in China, let a portion of it be in Tientsin, and the great body within striking distance, say at Pei-taiyo or Shanhaikuan, where good climatic and sanitary conditions are found. We recently noticed wise remarks of Mr.

William j Keswick, M.P., on this point. After all, it must be recognised that the "Chinese Government has to be carried on," and it will be wise if it can be so carried on that the Powers may exercise some contro! over it. China is long past the stage where she can last by her own strength; her only chance now is in the nice adjustment of the conflicting and rival interests of her enemies. Nolens volans, she has to tolerate their interference and to live by sufferance. The thread.of her independent political life is worn to the last degree of tenuity, and the slightest strain will snap, it, and lead to the only alternative—partition. We have ere now given the reason for the faith which is in us that Nanking should displace Peking as the future centre of power; we are confident that the determination to fortify the Legation quarter strongly is stultifying the greater policy and nearer aim of the Ministers, as well as furthering the permanent transfer of the capital to a more remote and inaccessible place, where the security we all insist upon will be less possible.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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