Tr is too son yet to prophesy of the final outcome of the Russo-Japanese struggle. The early successes of our friends have not unnaturally given a sanguine touch to the hopes of all who wish to see Japan emerge triumphant, but there isa considerable minority who take equally strong ground on the opposite side, and point to the South African war between Boer and Briton as.an illustration of what they expect.
Without going too far in the assertion of our faith in the continued good fortune of our allies, we definitely decline to accept the logic which finds analogies between the South African struggle and that of the present day. We fail to see the likeness. Differences there are of the most fundamental type. Similarities exist, but they are of a peculiarly accidental nature. When we have eliminated that of the early success of both Boers and Japanese, we have nearly come to the end of our tether. It is true that Russia is bigger. in area and in_ population than Japan, but the difference in numbers is not more than 3 to 1, while that between Briton and Boer was about 100 to 1 without calling in any of the Colonists.
How any thinking man can see such an analogy between the two sets of people as to argue from one to the other we cannot understand. The Boers numbered less than half-a-million all told; the Japanese are more than eighty times that num-per. The Boers never were, and possibly never will be, fighting men as we understand the term the Japanese are warriors after our own heart who know no fear and stick at no risk. The Boer was at best only an amateur soldier; the Jap is a polished professional. The Boer's ignorance was Cimmerian; the enlightenment of the Japanese can Dear comparison with that of any people. The Boer was confined to terra firma; the Jap is master of the sea, The Boer lacks initiative; the Tapanese is volcanic in his effervescence, and boils over with enterprise. The Boer was steeped in medieval superstition; the Japanese is Spen-cerion in his rationalism. The Boer had no discipline; the Japanese will die without a murmur at his post.
As between the Russians and the English, there is of likeness little, but of difference much. Both are given to slipshod preparation, and in consequence both almost expect to lose the initial moves in any war game they play. Both have tenacity aula fair share of grit. With this, we come, perhaps, to the end of our common characteristics. The Englishman looks to govern the sea, and during the Boer war his claim was not disputed. The Russian never had any sea power, and his desire to attain it does not, at the moment,; seem likely to be gratified. Our maritime supremacy gave us the advantage of placing our blows wherever we chose. The Russian loss of it has left them at the mercy of the Japanese with whom lies the initiative. Our reinforcements came from north, south, east, and west through a hundred different channels. Russia is tied to one sing'c-track railway of doubtful strength. There was no suggestion of monetary difficulty during the three years of our struggle with the Boers, but before three months have elapsed Russia is said by many to be upon the verge of bankruptcy: her people are acknowledged by one of her leading publicists to be "chronically starving," her artificial industrial system is tottering to a fall, and where the urgently needed national loan is to come from nobody seems to know. We had enough to complain of in our own War Office, though its most virulent enemy never dreamed of charging it with corruption. But in Russia, it is roundly asserted, the mest exhaustive search would fail to find one honest department. Nobody knows the condition of the national finances since there are no reliable figures; nobody knows whether military or naval stores that have undoubtedly been paid for have ever been supplied.
Russia can only retrieve ber Far Eastern position by regaining command of the sea. But with none of the facilities which England possesses in such plenty how is she to do it?
There is this further difference between the two struggles that while Great Britain could bring every ounce of her weight to bear, Russia is not ce favourably placed. She is on the horns of a most serious dilemma. Either she must outnumber her enemy or she must suffer defeat from his superiority in arms. If she outnumber him she is still threatened with defeat from starvation, It is hardly conceivable that Russia will be able with a single railway to feed enough men to give her the fruits of victory. If we turn to the average intelligence of the combatants in the wars we are contrasting, it may safely be said that, were "slimness" aside, the balance of education and general knowledge was on the side of England, whereas in the present war both slimness and intelligence have, so far, been shown by the Asiatic. There was, again, never any real fear that an outsider would intervene between ourselves and the Boers. Now, at any moment, that is to say at any favourable moment, China might throw her whole weight into the scale on behalf of Japan.
We fail to see, therefore, that because Great Britain, afler a very prolonged struggle, was completely successful against the Boers, it) must necessarily follow that Russia will be victorious over Japan, As we have tried to show, the chances are the other way. It is easy to see how Russia might repeat her Moscow success of 1812 if the Japanese were to repeat the mistakes of Napoleon. But that is most unlikely. If hostilities are prolonged, it will probably be less the campaign of 1812 than that of 1854 which will be imitated, With Port Arthur and Vladivostock as Sebastopols, and some modern lines of Torres Vedras across the northern end of the Corean Peninsula, there seems no reason for Napoleonic masquernding to a Siberian Moscow, Were Japan in strong possession of the above-named places it would seem as if the only effect to be attained by the knocking of the Russian head against the Mongolian wall would be a rapid re-entrance of that common-sense into Russian diplomacy which for some time it has lacked.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.