This was the situation at 1 o'clock on the 29th, when I received a visit from General Joffre at my headquarters.
I strongly represented my posi tion to the French Commander-in-Chief, who was most kind, cordial, and sympathetic, as he has always been. He told me that he had directed the 5th French Army on the Oise to move forward and attack the Germans on the Somme, with a view to checking pursuit. He also told me of the formation of the 6th French Army on my le't flank, composed of the 7th Army Corps, four Reserve Divisions, and Sordét's Corps of Cavalry.
I finally arranged with General Joffre to effect a further short retirement towards the line Oom-piégne-Soissons, promising him, however, to do my utmost to keep always within a day's march of him.
In pursuance of this arrangement the British Forces retired to position a few miles north of the line Compiégne-Soissons on the The right flank of the German Army was now reaching a point which appeared seriously to endanger my line of communications with Havre. I had already evaouated Amiens, into which place a German reserve division was reported to have moved.
Orders were given to change the base to St. Nazaire, and establish an advance base at Lo Mans. The operation was well carried out by the Inspector-General of Communications, In spite of a severe defeat inflicted upon the Guard 10th and Guard Reserve Corps of the Germany Army by the Ist and 3rd French Corps on the right of the sth Army, it was not part of General Joffre's plan to pursue this advantage; and s general retirement on to the line of the Marne was ordered, to which the French Forces in the more eastern theatre were directed to conform.
A new Army (the 9th) had been formed from three corps in the south by General Joffre, and moved into the space between the right of the 5th and left of the 4th Armies.
Whilst closely adhering to his strategic conception to draw the enemy on at all points until a favourable situation was created from which to assume the offensive, General Joffre found it necessary to modify from day to day the methods by which he sought to attain this object, owing to the devel-lopment of the enemy's plans and changes in the general situation.
In conformity with the movements of the French Forces, my retire ment continued practically from day to day. Although we were not severely pressed by the enemy, rearguard actions took place continually.
Capture of Enemy's Guas, On September 1, when retiring from the thickly-wooded country to the south of Compitgne, the Cavalry Brigade was overtaken by some German cavalry. They momentarily lost a Horse Artillery battery, and geveral officers and men were killed and wounded. With the help, however, of come detachments from the 3rd Corps operating on their left, they not only recovered their but succeeded i of the enemy's, Similarly, to the eastward, the Ist Corps, retiring south, also got into some very difficult forest country, and a somewhat severe rearguard action ensued at Villers-Cotterets, in which the 4th Guards Brigade suffered considerably.
On September 3 the British Forces were in position south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signeté Up to this time I had bern requested by General Joffre to defend the passages of the river as long as possible, and to blow up the bridges in my front. After I had made the necessary dispositions, and the destruction of the bridges had been effected, I was asked by the French Commander-in-Chief to continue my retirement to a point some 12 miles in rear of the position I then occupied, with a view to taking up a second position behind the Seine. This retirement was duly carried out. In the meantime th" enemy had thrown bridges and crossed the Marne in considerable fore, and was threatening the Allizs all along the line of the British Forces and the sth and oth French Armies.
Consequently several small outpost actions, took place.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.