In the February issue of the "Fortnightly Review," the well-known writer who assumes the signa~ ture of "Calchas" has a long and thoughtful article with the above title. Ib was still uncertain when the article was written whether the negotiations between Japan and Russia would fail, as they have done, or whether some compromise would be effected. It has been our own conviction throughout that Japan's existence as a leading Power in the Far East, if not her independence, was staked on her checking the advance of Russia, and "Calchas,"
will be seen, practically confirms this view of the situation, "Calchas" begins by pointing out that we do not as a people tal broad view of our foreign relations in other words, that we have not one prominent statesman, who has made foreign affairs lis province, who has a due sense of the proportion that the struggle in the Far East bears to British interests as " whole. We are all agreed that we must keep with our whole strength our treaty obligations towards our brilliant ally but we may be drawn into this and if we are, we must fight with our whole heart to secure fifty years of peace as we fought Napoleon to gain a hundred years of security. But it must not be forgotten that we may lose in one direction as much as we gain in another. "'The friendship of Japan would never compensate us fora renewal of enmity with France. The weakening of Russia, let us be certain, will be far from compensating us in the long run for the relative aggrandisement of Germany. It would be idle to disguise these preoccupations. It would be criminal levity if we could for one moment forget them. The Japanese Treaty limits our freedo.n of action, but. there is no reason why it should limit our freedom of mind."
"Calchas" goes on to elaborate his point that in foreign affairs we are swayed by the passion of the moment, and have no permanent principle of action. When we dislike Germany, we forget Russia; when we abuse Russia, we forget France. There is a too wide-spread inopression that France is getting tired of her attachment to Russia, but "every cool observer of European polities knows that for France there e shall find, no permanent substitute for the Russian connection." France cannot stand by in cold blood, says " Calchas," and see her ally utterly defeated, any more than we could look idly on and see our ally utterly destroyed. We are thus compelled to " consider with the utmost clearness the probable reaction of the Far Eastern crisis upon our interests in cther parts of the world." Unfortunately, the popular mind in Great Britain has no clear working theory of its foreign relations.
First, we must get rid of the idea that Russia is something like the enemy of the human race. As a malter of fact, a Muscovite is a very good fellow, and privately he and the Englishman are always good friends. We rail against " Muscovite intrigue," but every Power resorts more or less to intrigue, and our_use of it would be as great as Russia's—as it has been in the past— were we not hindered by our Parliamentary system and the exiguity of our secret service funds. " We are not more convinced of Russian perfidy and rapacity than the ordinary vulgar politician in most European countries was convinced that British policy was habitually actuated by hypocrisy and greed." Mr. Bezobrasoft, who is supposed to have overcome the Czar's devotion to peace for his own sinister purposes, is only what Cecil Rhodes was in the mind of the German public. The imputation of vicious motives is not only always a mistake, but in the present case it is entirely unnecessary. The struggle between Russia and Japan is fundamentally a struggle for the command of the strategical situation in the Far East. "Either Japan must be at the mercy of Russia, or Russia will be menaced by inerensing danger from Japan. Sooner or later, one or the other will be supreme in the Far East, and if we are wise we shall consent to study the problem from both points of view." Russia's path of conquest is barred by Germany in the Near East, England in the Middle East, and Japan in the Far East. Entrenched in Corea Russia would threaten Japan's very existence; while "the final loss of the peninsula by Russia would be a check so complete and depressing, a disadvantage so decisive and permanent in its character, that any Power in Rassia's situation would be justified in fighting for Corea if there were a reasonable prospect of success."
Having thus shown, by an argnment of which we have only given a very bare summary, that a struggle between Japan' and Russia is inevitable, "Calchas," who sees that Russiv's offensive power has been greatly overestimated, proceeds to express a hope that war may still be averted, by what he calls the rational solution" of allowing Rus-sin to take Manchuria and Japan Corea, China is trent 1as an entirely negligible quantity, " Calchas" concludes by saying Whether sooner or later, without, war or after wat, Corea is likely to become Japanese, and Manchuria to remain Russian, A peaceful solution in that sense depends upon regarding the issue not as one between light and darkness, bnt as between two sets of political interests exceptionally difficult to adjust, between two great Powers who have come against each other as the result of equally inevitable processes of expansion in opposite direc-ions, Let us remember that the maintenance of the friendship with France ought now to be the first object of our diplomacy in Europe. Let us agree to remember that Russia is the ally of France, and restrain the luxury of our moral sentiments in deference to that fact, exnetly as we appreciate the courtesy of the French Press towards our own If British and French public opinion can cearly unite in the conviction that Cores ought to become Japanese and Manchuria to remain Russian, the solution that a trial of strength could scarcely fail to enteres might be reached even at the eleventh hour, without recourse to arms."
But Japan's object, in which she is supported by Great Britain and the United States, is that Corea shall remain independent under Japan's protection, and Manchuria remain Chinese. And Russia does not limit her designs on China to Manchuria,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.