A forecast of the consequences of the capture of Port Arthur has recently appeared in the "Temps." The following is translation of the article in full "(ZA Russian officer was recently expounding the well-known thesis that in war fortresses are useless and that all depends upon the great battles fought in the open field by the rival armies; he recalled the fatal attraction Metz exercised on the French leaders in 1870 and how much the attitude of Bazaine had been influenced by the vicinity of the fortress, According to him, the strategy of Kuropatkin is free of such errors. Thence he goes on to condemn the fault that the Japanese commit in undertaking the siege of Port orth "So much the better for us!" he shall be able to concentrate in peace at Linoyang."
Such reasoning is on a par with that of the Arab who, seeing his house on fire, let it bum thankful he was not in' it Perhaps he too said that he was concentrat. ing on himself in order to fight better the battle of life. But having so little combative. ness in him, he did not deserve success, Likewise here, the placidity, the inertness with which the principal Russian force contemplates the attack of Port Arthur by the Japanese does not augur well of final success. But has this different rin; more Tolstoi-like than Dragomiroff-like (Dragomiroff is the leading Russian strategist; it will be recalled he was oppoael to the war and predicted disaster)—has this army of non-resistance to evil the right to separate its destinies from the fate of the fortress, or are their fortunes so timately connected that the fall of the one will necessarily end in the ruin of the other? There is no doubt about the answer to this question, when one thinks, of the vital interest Russia has staked in Port Arthur, and of what she would lose in losing it.' Indeed, the most ambitions autocracy could not have chosen on the map of the world a more enviable good phical position, a strategical point of Ester Bosphorus, that anther Russian eater strength. That is truly the generation thought to have found in Viadivostock. Port Arthur commands the Gulf of Pechili almost as surely as Constantinople holds the key tothe Black Seo. It dominates the Yellow Ses, and its influence is felt through"ut Corea and China. Ibis, besides, or will be to-morrow, a naval station of the first rank. The western basin has only to be dredged and an opening cut through the Tiger's Tail to get the full advantages of a topographical situation which makes of it the largest and best sheltered natural haven. been able to exploit to the: full. She was?s|STEADY, DEMOCRATS, drawing on. them ~by tracing beforehand arauad Port Arthur asa contre the ci other future expansion,. Dalny, admi trative creation, was only the fancy of a Minister more bold in: his toms than fortunate in his conceptions. twas an opera scene, similar to. those Potemkine erected on the route followed by the great C: therine in 1787, to make her believe the Crimes was in!-ahited. But Port Arthur is inhabited; there were there officials, soldiers and sailors; huge military buildings were being put up; the Vicero lived there; it was in a word " " capi and by that very: fact an object that the Japanese could assign to their main force without violating the principles of Moltke and Napoleon.
The Russians: understood that so well that they took care to concentrate imposing means of defence upon Port Arthur, two field-divisions, the fortress troops, and the crews of the ships make a total of 50,000 as ili, can resist several months. men which, commanded by so able a general Yet, everything happens in war, and the Supreme commander must provide for every eventuality. Whatever precaution he may have taken against the occurrence of iaaster, the hypothesis of the capture of Port Arthur must. present itself to Kuropatkin's mind. He must see that the consequences of it would be irreparable andre cannot hope to derive any profit from longer inaction. with Port Arthur. Such catastrophes are Fifty thousand men would be captured not unknown in history. The.capitulations of Sedan and Metz were graver, more painful for our honour, harder to forget for our history. And yet, the France of 1870 immediately created "ther armies; she had only to stamp in her soil to make new ones spring up. Russia, on the other hand, had transported hers along the endless Trans-Siberian. The fad demonstrated Gist to. brine 50,000 experience of the present concentration men into Manchuria two whole months are necessary.
The loss of time and the loss of troops nothing, however. We must think what the strategical situation of the Russians will he if the Japanese get into Port Arthur and a new siege is necessary to drive them out. To transport the necessary material, organise the si services, that at the other end of the world and without the help of the sea, isa task above human forces. Such desperate tasks are undertaken only when the Supreme game is being playa', when more than honour is engaged, when life in at stake. They are not attempted when the fatal question. "What is. the goo?" springs in every mind, and where doubt as to the ultimate advantage prevents the last resources being engaged in the war, That is a sombre perspective. There is 'a blacker one yet. The fall of Port Arthur would bring about, in some form or other, the ruin of the Russian ficer and complete the Japanese mastery of the sea. They could broome ungetatable on the Conti. nent by the facility of landing and embark. ing everywhere; the war would en hide-and-seck game in which the Russi bear'would always be caught by his agile adversary.
From that moment, the offensive, the great war of masses becomes impossible. eisive. The Russians "know it. Gots The campaign of 1901 will have been de-the hopes they found on the Baltic fleet if it ever succeeds in joining that of Port Arthur. Hence the care with which they: prepare their concentration at Lisoyang to intervene, once the summer rains are over, with all their fores gathered and in numerical superiority.—" Hongkong Telegraph."
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.