Somewhere, in Peking or elsewhere, a Government "must, set wp which will inspire tru: and P expect throughout—the country, 80 that no party crelement will have a legitimate excuse for withholding either' financial, military pr moral support. One cannot expect the Provincial satraps, in their inde-Pendent position to remit money fo Peking when they have reason to believe that this same neoncy would be squandered more recklessly by the Peking, parasites than by their own. "One cannot expect to ree abolish the ancient prestige of Peking in the pro-Vinces while Poking's officials have neither the physical tus the demoralized army, useless ral force to cnmmant pect. alike for national defence and for the preservation of internal order, must be reduced to a minimum before there can be any hope reforming ib and mace © 9 RNsione of the right Kind of national of it. treopm "could restore order, Chino with' me, hun burden gone wrong.
To make possible the disband: ott 'a first.casential step is discouragement of The disbanded soldier xho, has never known any real Wiseipline in the ranks, now has tw, alternatives when he eaves the army. One is to go home wud work and the other is, to turn bandit until he is rein-Histed. The first essential towards the restoration of order is to eliminate the second of these al-formatives ay that when the soldier loaves the army ho will fave nothing more attractive to do than hunt for work. All this talk of providing diers wi work or of opening new fields of colonization to soldiers is criminal nonsense at this juncture. The first task before the military who really want to reduce their armies wee what forces they have to make banditry so horribly unprofitable that no disbanded soldier will think of turning to it if he can find honest employment. After that, if there is not work for all, itis time enough to talk of "new public works and of Soldier colonies on the frontiers.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.