Suonr as the revolution has been, there might be scope for an instractive article on wasted, or apparently, wasted, opportunities. For example, it would be interesting to know why Peking delayed so long descend upon Wuchang, and why before the freebooters have broken} watch over British interests and through all restraint: and even if the lives along some hundreds of miles alarm should prove groundless, at jof the Yangtze, not ta speak of the least no harm will hava been done}Canton river and some thousands by taking due precautions. of miles of coast. We do not doubt The second opportunity is sug-that the situation is at least as clear-indirectly by that urgently recognized by the naval authori-appeal from the British residen's of ties as by any outsider, but at a Hankow which we reproduce else- time like the present expressions of where to-day. As regards the landing of foreign. troops, soldiers as distinct from sailors—in China, there are, as we pointed out in connexion with Shanghai, special considerations which must cause such an undertaking to be approached with the utmost caution. Hankow stands in a peculiar position. Ft is a valuable British possession situated between two warring armies, and the men in it have already public opinion should serve at least to strengthen their hands in appealing to headquarters.
It must be emphasized that there is no desire on our part to take an alarmist view of the situation, less still to underrate the good will, or, within a restricted area, the ability of the republican forces to maintain order; least of all to suggest anything in the nature of intervention actual or prospective. But General Li, with his vastly superior|done more than should be asked of numbers, has not out the} them for the protection of the proattacking force even at a cost of|perty of which, in the main, they several thousand men; for what! are only stewards. So the case of parpose Yuan Shih-kai tarried on Hankow may appeal on its own 0 road to Peking, and why merits, and we earnestly hope that General Chang did not make a the appeal will not be made in vain. bold dash for Chinkiang and Soo-But as regards the rest of China chow before the revolutionary forces and other means of defence, we feel had had time to assemble. To such convinced that we are but voicing questions there are no doubt ood the general opinion when we say starting from the general principle, readily recognized by the belligarents, that Great Britain must, protect the lives of her nationals, we do say that there is not sufficient evidence that she realizes the penning of the protection required. Tt may be that private arrangements exist whereby, in case of necessity, Great Britain would rely on the assistance of some third party. It is answers, but for all the numbers of correspondents that—_are! at work, one part of China! still remains distressingly ignorant of what passes in another. As a case in point, there is much that it is vital to know about Sze-' chan. But apart from ominous and imperfect reports from the most accessible parts of that vast province, we know nothing, And this brings us to the point of this article, a8 suggested in the title. Not one man in China to-day would venture to prophesy what next! week may bring forth. We live in realms of pure conjecture, and all that can be said with any rea-is that the revolution threatens to sonable probability of being correct,
last far longer thoo was once anticipated. As it continues, so do the chances of disorder increase. We do not underrate the good intentions of the revolutionaries to keep order. But a glance at any mission map will show what numbers of stations there are in the interior, not to be reached except by days or even weeks of travel. Ought not the men and women in those stations to be ordered down to the nearest point of refuge? Trustworthy reports of pillaging by banditti are received every day from some new quarter. Bad characters seize the chance presented by the revelation to ran riot; and before they can be quelled, tives may have been sacrificed as in Shensi and Szechuan. The opportunity to call in foreigners from outlying districts is now, that the British naval forces in the Far East should be very greatly strengthened. In yesterday's issue we published a letter from our Tchang correspondent on which in this connexion too much stress cannot be laid. The writer pointed out that just when the defence of the town had been organized, and British residents, confronted with the double anxiety of the probable behaviour of the unpaid railway coolies and the impending arrival of refugees from Szectiuan, were beginning to enjoy some sense of security, the news of the burning of hankow necessitated the withdrawal of the one British gunboat which formed the backbone of the defence.
With our correspondent's comments an excellent thing to have good friends and we appreciate their cooperation in the highest degree. But is Great Britain sunk to the rank of a second-class Power that she cannot spare a few extra men-of-war for the safeguarding of the interests which she-was the first of the great Powers to build up in the Far East? We are not speaking for Shanghai alone in this matter but for all parts, and especially for those remote from the coast. At the present time the story of boats os beng rossed into service Ichang suggests that river
for work which might be done by larger vestals. The inference is that if the cruiser department were augmented, the gunboats would be on this withdrawal we will not|set free for the work for which they attempt to deal, in view of the fact|are specially adapted. The con-that the general naval scheme of siderations that weigh against the defence has, for natural reasons, landing of soldiers do not apply in not been given for publication. But] respect of a strengther ing of the the most reasonable explanation is probably this, that the ships at Ad. miral's Winsloe's disposal are inadequate for the tremendous task that. is at present laid upon them. All told, the China squadron consists of twenty-nine vessels, Of these, six are cruisers of varying strength six are described in the Navy List attached ships, among them being included the Alacrity herself, classed as a despatch vessel; ten are shallow-draft river gunboats, seven are torpedo-boat destroyers, of which some at least, we believe, are shortly to be discarded. With this puny force, the Admiral is expected to fleet; while there point, that troops are more or less tied to the spot, whereas ships are mobile, and although we recognize that their crews cannot long be spared for land service, they should surely be available for any great emergency until other assistance could arrive. It may be that no snob emergency will arise. We trust most sincerely that it will not. But the outlook is, to say the least, doubtful. No man can foresee how long the revolution may last nor what it will produce: and in the meantime the choice lies between {some extra precautions at a come
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.