June 25.
"THE conversations revealed a common determination to overcome difficulties by means of continuous ce-operation." runs the official communique regarding the conversations between Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and M. Herriot at The Chequers during the week-end. And then further statement from Par:
Everything possible was done to create an atmosphere of sympathy and confidence;" and to Mr. MacDonald Paris also attributes the assurance that:
"in case of German defaults Germany will find herself face to face with Britain, France and Belgium united inflexibly as. during the war." The public have come to feel a well founded \distrust of all official communiques during and especially since the war. How many conferences there have been between Great Britain and France on the subject of German Reparations, how often the same fair-sounding, oficial reports have been issued, only to result in nothing done and the breach between the two countries widened yet more, it would be a waste of time to reali. But there is something in the tone of the reports of the latest interview between the Britich and French Premiers which revives confidence and inspires hope that at last the two nations are standing shoulder to shoulder and that this time Germany will not be able to drive a wedge between them. "the prospect of friendly co-<peration will indeed be welcome 4o the British people as, we feel sure, to the French. The old saying that "kissing goes by, kindness" applies nowhere morg, truly than in the case of France, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald has been'" persona grata with" the French people since his first fair and frank letter to M. Poincaré, after his accession to power.
is, however, only fair to admit that the way to an understanding between the two Premiers has been immensely, simplified by the report of the Dawes Commission. The details of that momentous document may well be recalled. The first of- its recommendations is that a new issue bank, or the old Reichsbank. reorganized, should bbe established in Germany, with a monopoly over the issue of paper currency properly secured on a gold reserve, partly held abroad, while all existing paper should' be withdrawn, The control of the bank would be in the hands of a German president and a Board of seven Germans and seven foreigners, Allies and others, An elaborate schedule of the amounts that Germany, would pay year by year is then set out, but the Commission was not empowered to state the total amount which Germany will have to pay. The German railways should be handed over for fifty years to an international company, with a capital of 26,000,000,000 gold marks, of which the Reparations Commission would hold: 11,000,000,000 six per cent, debentures, giving an annual yield after the fourth year of 660,000,000 gold marks, 'AS in the case of the bank, half the Board would be appointed by the Reparations Commission, Certain taxes would also be controlled by foreign commis-As regards payments in kind, the Commission ropresents that in order to avoid upsetting the foreign exchange market these should be paid for out of the monies accruing in Germany to the agent for reparation payments. Two essential parts of the scheme are, first, that Germany must recover her iseal_and economic rights over the Ruhr; without which the experts emphasize that their plans would be futile; secondly, that Germany should issue in the first year a foreign loan of 800,000,000 gold marks in order to enable her to stabilize her currency and to finance payments in kind during the time economic recovery. It is furth to be noted that: in the Commission's recommendations the Allies should make no call upon Germany's budget revenues for the next two years, payment of reparations being provided for out of the foreign loan just mentioned and revenue from railways, The experts calculate that by the end of 1928-1920 Germany's financial and economic situation will have returned to normal.
The scheme when published at the beginning of April had "a very good press" even in France, The provision that Germany must recover her fiscal and economic control over the Ruhr is perhaps the most dubious point. On the other hand, it is to be remembered that ' when first going into Germany Fran: fully intended that her occupation of the Ruhr should only be an invisible military one; and that the extension of her hold over all the industrial life of the district was forced upon her by the policy of passive resistance actively pursued by, the German Government. Nobody expects that the military occupation will cease until Germany has at least paid up the bulk of what she owes. On this point there is no difference whatever in the opinions of Frenchmen, whether they Royalists, Republicans or Communists, But if France is con-
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.