That Germany must not be an aggressor on the sea against Great Britain was perfectly clear to the German writer. He urged upon his countrymen a naval campaign of extreme caution, in conjunction with vigorous resistance to landings of British troops. This policy, apparently, has been decided upon by Germany, She seems to be holding back her men-of-war and proparing herself against British attacks on land by ruthlessly brushing aside the neutrality of Belgium, Holland and Denmark.
Von Bernhardi also counselled the speedy crippling of the Russian fleet, to keep it from helping Great Britain and France. Here, too, he seemed to speak with a foreknow-Jedge of the future, his countrymen in the Baltic already having struck foord at the Tsar's navy and driven into the Gulf of Finland, far from the fleets of its allies.
Von Bernhardi's book created no end of a stir. On account of the high position of its author, it was looked upon as practically an offi foreshadowing of the policy that would be followed by Germany in case of war. Now that the war is actually being waged, the official nature of Von Bernhardi's statements is evident on every page.
Particularly interesting just now are the ideas advanced in the books! on how Germany should meet England's great sea power and endea-your to offset its unquestioned superiority to the German naval forces. The author points out that, Harwich hag recently been transformed into strong naval harbour, It is considered the best harbour age on the English coast, and is scarcely 300 nautical miles from the German coast. It offers good possibilities of fortification and safe ingress and egress in time of war. The distance from the German ports is not, however, very material for purposes of blockade. The English, if they planned such a blockade, would doubtless count on acquiring bases whereas on land Germany will have on our own coast—perhaps also on the help of Austria, she will be the Dutch const. thrown on her own resources on the "Our task, therefore, is to pre water, and is not strong enough to yeat such attempts by every mean take the offensive even in the form Not only must every point which is of a sudden attack like that of suitable for a base, such as Heligo-Japan on Port Arthur. He writes: land, Burkum and Syl, be fortified in time of peace, but all attempts Defensive War at First. at landing must' be hindered and "We should at first carry on a complicated by our fleet. This defer war, and would therefore] task can only be fulfilled by the have to reckon on a blockade of fleet in daytime by submarines; by our coasts, if we succeed in repel-night torpedo boats may ce-operate ling the probable English attack.
"'Buch a blockade can be carried b if the landing forces are atill cutin two ways, England can blockade closely our North Sea coast, and at the same time bar the Danish blockade offers various possibil of damage the enemy, if the coast fortification -|are so constructed with a view to cations with our Baltic ports} onthe offensive that the fleet may she can seal up on the one sit protection, and channel between England hus gain an opportunity of adv the Continent, on the other side the; from their stations for offense open sea between the north of operations, Such possibilities exist Scotland and Norway, on the? on our north coast, and our efforts Peterhead-Ekersund line, and thus must be turned toward making the cripple our oversea commerce, and! most varied use of them. We must also control the Belge-Dutch, endeavour by renewed and un-
Danish and Swedish shipping.
close blockade in the first case would greatly tax the resources of the English fleet. According to the view of English experts, if a blockade is to be maintained permanently, the distance between the base and the blockading line must not exceed 200 nautical miles.
Since all the English naval ports are considerably further than th from our const the difficulties of carrying on the blockade will be enormously increased. That appears to be the reason why the estuary at expected attacks, especially by night, partly with submarines and torpedo-boats, partly with battleships, to give the blockading fleet no breathing time and to cause it as much loss as possible.
"Woe must not engage in a battle with superior hostile forces, for it is hardly possible at sea to discon-inno a fight, because there is no place whither the loser can withdraw from the effect of the enemy's guna An engagement, once begun, must be fought out to the end. And appreciable damage can be inflicted
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.