The Archive · 1914

The Battle of Flanders

dee. 2.

Sir John French's despatch describing the transference of the British forces from the Aisne to Flanders and the graphic account which we reproduce from th? "Daily Chronicle," of the first fortnight's fighting in Flanders, bring home to us, as perhaps nothing yet published, how much lies behind those brief official communiques on which we must try to appease our hunger for news from day to day. Clearly the journalist's description of the battle of Flanders as the blood-lest in history is endorsed by the Field-Marshal: and Britons in all lands have deep cause to thank their gallant soldiers their French and Belgian allies for the undaunted stand they have made against giant guns and overwhelming numbers. But these despatches do more than intensify our appreciation of the courage of the Allied armies, They also throw instructive light on German strategy. The popular belief that the enemy was trying to get to the Channel ports is borne out by what Sir John French says. Had he done! so, we may disregard the German stories of a new gun that! was to shoot all the way from Calais to Dover as merely intended to frighten us—but it is quite possible that the German fleet would have ventured out, with the idea of distracting the attentions of the British Navy while an invading force was being shot into England. More effective would have been the turning of the whole Allied line from Armentiéres to Raye. Thus in the battle of Flanders may be seen the second German scheme for the invasion of France, if not also of England, and when we remember the brave resistance of the Allied forces, we must not forget the genius of General Joffre's strategy three months ago. Had the Allied armies, which in August were not as well prepared as their enemy, and the people making use of attempted to make @ stand near the frontier comparable to whit they have been making in Flanders, with the enemy's forces fresh and able to be concentrated at fall power on any one point as they then were, he must have broken through. The supreme virtue of General Joffre's long retreat was not so much that it enabled him to deal a crushing blow on the Onureq and the Mame as that it led to the spreading out of the hostile millions over such a front that they could no longer catch the Allies at the same disadvantage as before. Immensely superior in numbers as they still were in Flanders, they were not 80 superior that the disparity could not be covered by the individual courage and determination of the Belgians, French and British. We do not underrate the valour of the German private which has been truly prodigious: but it is not unfair, perhaps, to see in the battle of Flanders once more the contest between man and machine, between the individual spontaneity of the Allies, and the German reliance on material and machine-like masses of infantry in dense formation. And once again individuality has triumphed. This, then, is the second Brent phase of the war.

Whether it is over, whether the silence of the past few days is a prelude to another German retirement, or only to yet more desperate effort who shall say. But for six weeks the enemy tried to batter in the gatea of Flanders only to fail, and his failure not only weakens his own aptitude for farther attack but inspires the Allies with new resolution to. resist him.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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