Some observers go so far as to say that immediately on receiving the news.of the coup in Peking, Wa Pei-fu should have withdrawn his line to Lanchow. The retirement would have cost him considerable loss in men and material, but nothing like the loss: he eventually suffered. It would have cost him much in prestige, but he had then 'a much better opportunity of regaining it than he has now. How-fever, he did not adopt the drastic measure that the new situation imperatively demanded, and seeing that he did not do so, the alternative was to return to Peking as quickly as possible, and with a larger force, including the 24th Division, which had been kept in reserve for operations from the Manchurian coast. They could easily have been spared, for the Chihli armies massed from Shanhaikuan to Shihmenchai numbered 20,000 more than the opposing forces. Ad-Justments in the face of new tent on carrying out original plans even to the extent of keeping the 24th waiting for the time when a Innding would be propitious.
The news of the coup in Peking reached headquarters ingChinwang= tao on October 23, but it was not until the evening of the 25th that Wu Pei-tu took action. He then counted on prompt assistance from the Yangtze tuchuns, and took only 8 few thousand men with him to Tientsin, expecting to be able to Tead an almost fresh army against Feng Yuchsiang of which the men from Chinwangtao would form the vanguard. He did not even take his own bodyguard with him. was said before Wu turned his attention to the Peking front that two Kiangsu division on their way north to joi puni tive expedition." These two units, together with other contingents from the Yangtze provinces, were ordered to be deflected at Tientsin. and others to be rushed north im-
Wu arrived in Tientsin pr cause he surrounds many incompetents, persons to whom he fancies he is indebted for services in the past. To entrust any operation to some of the limpets with his "punitive expedition" would have been to court disaster. for a commander-away his jobs as the major undertakings of eralissimo was to court di a much bigger scale. And this is what nearly happened on October 14, when Wu Pei-fu left his army and reconnoitred the Manchurian' coastline for a position from which a landing party could attack the enemy's rear.
1. A One-Man Army It was because of this habit of superintending almost every dotal in his campaign that his army a Chinwangtao was called a one-man army. It also earned him a criticism that he is an excellent battalion commander, but hardly of the stuff that army commanders are made of.
His generalship has been called to account for his handling of the situation created by the defection of Feng Vu-hsiang. The withdrawal of Wang Chen-ping, Feng Vu-hsiang and Wang Huai-ching and the whole of the second and third armies from active participation in the conflict with the Mukden warlord seemingly necessitated drastic alteration in Wu's plan of campaign. For one thing, it left the passes west of Chiumen unprotected against the entrance of the Fengtien forces: It left the whole of his flank exposed, and his main line of communications, jousand men, and waited a week for reinforcements to arrive. In the meantime he had been severed from his main army by the incursion of body after body of Fengtien forces, and nothing remained but to watch the oncoming of Feng Vu-hsiang with his vastly superior forces and perhaps for his own departure. It was the end of the adventure.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.