Field-Marshal Marquis Yamataga has consented to be "interviewed by a reptesentative of the " Nichi Nichi Shimbun." He says:—"In recent years Russian enterprise in the East had showed great expansion, The year 1898- saw her the lessee of Port Arthur and Talien. A very Grave situation was thus created, We cee saw that she must clash with Japan's interests and we applied ourselves early consider what course to adopt. The sam of our reflections was that, from a historical and geographical point of view, a forward policy must be pursued in Corea, and that Japan must not submit to be controlled in that sphere by any of the great Powers. Russia, However, steadily increased her forces, and there could be no concealing her evil designs. In July of 1903 we opened negotiations with her the fight. Our determination that as a matter of self-defence and as a matter of national devel-lopment Corea must not be abandoned to Russis, In pursuance of that r-solve war became inevitable, To spank uureservedly, it must be confessed that on the eve of crossing swords with a Power of such renowned strength our estimate of the issue was not very confident. On the sea the forces were about equally matched arith-1 matically, but whereas our enemy had had no actual experience of war for many: years, we had. Therefore we believed firmly that at least our fleet would not be totally defeated before it had annihilated his, On land, however, there was a vast difference: four millions against half-a million. Yet he had to move his men by 'a single live of railway, which limited the number he could put in the field. In point of military equipment ho was if anything our superior and in the matter of officers' education both sides wore about equal. Only in mountain fighting in Corea and Lisotung the Japanes troops were nut likely tobe beaten. Thus considered, the prospects of the land campaign did not seem to us altogether hopeless. But it was a serious business. There was no certainty of success as a non-expert might suppose. Not until our plans had boon fully laid, our preparations completed at every point and the supreme tost of combat applied could the prospect of victory unfold itself. It was a time of the keenest anxiety. But success or failure lies in the lap of fortune. Wo had to be prepared for partial discom-future. Complete defeat, however, would concern Japan's fate and was not to be suffered under any circumstance Not we alone were determined that even though Japan were transformed into a barren island we would fight to the end and cease only with death all wore of like resolution. So the war opened. Huppily unlooked-for victory w won, Then, after the Buttle of Mukden, Europe and America began to say that humanity called for the end of the war, and after the Battle in the Sea of Japan the President of the United States suggested-a conference which ended in the present peace. It appears that the terms are very severely criticised. Men's opinions differ and it is inovitable that there should be controversy. But the Cabinet, in deciding to make peace, was influenced by several considerations: by the actual state of the Empire's finances; by the quence of future national development by Rassia's comparative invulnerability to blows struck in the Far Kast; by the attitude of the world. Viewing the mat ter from all these standpoints we saw that to continue the war would have involved heavy sacrifices, and would not have attained results roster than those attainable by making peace now We shrank therefore from wasting the resources which the country would need for its fature enterprises in Gorea and in the leased regions Manchuria. From this decision there wat not one dissentient person, nor was thers division into "weak" and "strong If to make peace was wrong, taen we ar"
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.