The Archive · 1925

THE POWERS AND CHINA TO-DAY?

Oct, 21. yesterday's paper we recalled the main outlines of Mr. Austin Chamberlain's speech to} the China Association, in which he laid down clearly and unmistakeable Great Britain's. jolley towards China, That: policy was first defined in the Mackay Treaty of 1902. It was reiterated and expanded in the Washington Treaty of 1921, And in spite of the unmerited insulte, and injuries of the past summer, Britain has never swerved from)

It is based on necessary.

"The first," Mr. Chamberlain said, "is an atmosphere of mutual good. will, putting aside little suspicions erning great peoples, not having their roots in China or here but disseminated, engendered and encouraged by those who see their opportunity in other people's troubles and are as little regardful of the interests of China as they are of the goodwill of "The second requirement for the full fruition of our hopes and par-Poses ix a China at peace within itself, united with an effective central authority who can undertake engagements and see them kept, who can provide security for life and property, and who thus can make possible for strangers and guests within her gates surrender} of—I will not say privileged, for it is not a privileged but} of the special position treaties we and other have enjoyed.

yur only wish is for a strong, united, independent, orderly ai prosperous China. The meeting of the tariff conference gives to the Chinese themselves an unrivalled opportunity to advance their own freedom, to secure respect for their Government and themselves and to) take their place with all their immemorial history behind them in yank with the great modern, civil and progressing nat "Will China take the chance that} is open to her? Will she seize the opportunity as it passes? I do not Know. The salvation of China can only come from the Chinese and the measure of her progress and the extent of her progress will be the measure and extent of the capacity, and goodwill whick the Chinese] Government can bring to the solotion of, this great question." tions and a desire to assist her to attain them in every possible way. It maps out a certain course leading to tariff autonomy, and to the eventual abolition of extraterritoriality. And the only condition it asks for is that China shall afford to foreigners the same equal treatment that most sovereign Powers give to the citizens of other States living within their borders. With this policy there is no doubt other foreign Powers agree and the Tariff Conference embodies their idea for the ultimate fulfilment} of one part of the scheme.

The basis of the conference is to bring the provinces and Poking to a community of financial)

commercial interests.

An hi important part of the project is to stimulate all the trade of China, as undoubtedly it would be stimulated beyond all computation, by removing the vexatious imposts which throttle trade in all provinces and are conveniently summed up in that word of ill"repute, likin. But! it is recognized that the provinces will never agree to the abolition of likin, unless they' can be assured of equivalent revenue from other sources, Hence the idea of an addition to the Maritime Customs tariff, the proceeds of which should be shared between the Central Government and the provinces: and it is Delieved that if both sides loyally agreed to such a reform motion, the increased trade resulting would be far more valuable than whatever sum, prod auction prohibited without permission. collected under the present system. Furthermore, from the common interest, which all parties would find they had la assisting trade, other perceptions of community would de-[velop and disorganization would give place to unity.

It is specially emphasized that there is no thought whatever of providing Peking with the wherewithal for a big loan, or lof bolstering up one party at the expense of others. And it is thought that the famous limitation clause of the Washington Treaty in regard to the levying of the surtax—"from such date, for such purposes and subject such conditions as it (the Conference) may determin would afford all the guarantees needed in this direction. May we, however, suggest' that a further most important condition ig necessary, namely, that the Conference should in no cireumstances whatever agree to the surtax being used to provide security for foreign loans now unsecured? There are certain loans contracted in and since 1918, British, we regret to say, well as Japanese, for which claim is certain to be made, But the justice of that claim is by no means as certain, There is no mention whatever in the promise given at Washington of the additional revenue being used to secure these loans; they are extraordinarily unpopular among the Chinese and recogni= tion of them will wreck the Conference in Chinese eyes, while it would at once clear the way for new, party loans, however hard the Powers might try to prevent them. For once they have agreed to outstanding debts being secured on the new revenue, any control they might have had over it is neutralized, But the main problem befora———...—the Conference is, not might become of the surtax, but whether China is at present capable of realizing the idea of a common interest on which it is based, or even wishes to do 80, [Before the meteoric uprising of Sun Chuan-fang, the Anfu party in Peking has striven to prevent actual warfare by a rapid retreat all along the line. But whether there is fighting or not, the moral effect for the Tariff Conference is the sama, Peking tries to pretend that Sun Chuanfang has been galvanized into his present activities by scaremongering politicians, which is absurd in any light, For even if Sun Chuan-fang were the kind of man to let himself be stampeded, which seems very unlikely, then the political opponents of Peking must be extraordinarily powerful to stampede him with such effect. The inference is the same, whether Sun is leader or led, principal or puppet, namely, a China hopelessly, bitterly divided, with either part of which it is childish to think of entering into solemn agreements, We have no preference for the one side or the other, although, measured by the protection afforded to foreigners during the past summer, Wu Pei-fu's party we more claim on our consideration than Tuan Chi-jui's, We merely point to the incontrovertible fact that China is divided and that tariff concessions would certainly widen the breach, And it is very much to be feared that there are plenty of Chinese who do not wish thi country to be united, because they are making a very good thing out of schism, What our Chengtu correspondent says today of the generals in Szechuan is probably true of most generals elsewhere.

Are the foreign delegates then to have been brought all this way, and with so much imposing appearance, on a fool's errand? Not if they can agree to make the Tariff Conference ancillary to the greater issue. The additional tariff has been promised and must be granted; and the

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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