Nov. 24.
Tr has taken the Diplomatic Body just two months to arrive at a unanimous decision in respect of China's breaking off relations with Prince Koudacheff. But now that they have agreed, they are certainly to be congratulated on the nature of their conclusions.
The Note sent to the Waichiaopu and published by us last Monday embodies certain principles and ways of observing them which should on the whole, fairly well safeguard Russian extraterritorial rights. The Note begins by pointing out that China's undertakings in this respect do not appear to have been executed ''—a mild way of expressing it; and goes on to enumerate _indispensable requirements: the maintenance. of Russian police in Russian Concessions; the perpetuation of the old Russian Courts, their organization and personnel; the appointment of Russian advisers where there are no Russian Courts; and the institution of a special Russian bureau at the Waichiaopu, also with Russian advisers.
As yet there is no news of the Waichiaopu's reply, but it is scarcely to be expected that that reply will be an unqualified acceptance of the Diplomatic Body's demand. For example, the Tientsin Concession appears to have been under the control of a Chinese Commissioner since a day or two after the rupture" mandate of September 23. Peking will not easily relinquish such prize: rather, it seems chiefly to have been concerned with plans for getting Hankow also into its clutches. We know also from his own past utterances that the Chinese Foreign Minister's suptreme ambition is to abolish extra-\territoriality in China and he would naturally be reluctant to accept conditions which would deprive him of so favourable an opportunity as the rupture with Prince Koudacheff has given him, establishing a precedent here and a precedent there against plenary restitution of Russian rights, in the day when Russia has once more a Government. Even if the Diplomatic Body's Note were fully accepted, it contains weak points. Why, for instance, should " mixed courts deal with Sino-Russian cases wherein Russians are defendants''? If a Chinese sues an Englishman, he goes to the British Court. Why should a Russian be treated dif-fervently? Similarly, why are purely Chinese courts to try cases in which Chinese are defendants?
And in respect of Russian adviserships, it is one thing to get them appointed, but quite another to secure for them any power, as is notoriously the misfortune of most advisers in Peking, even those who give advice which it would profit China to accept.
The value of the Note would seem to consist principally in this: that it records the Diploma-tie Body's perception of the fact that China has not been true to her pledges towards Russians, and that it debars her from arguing another day that, because the
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.