Prince Bernhard von Bilow in his book entitled Imperial Ger-"an English translation of was published 9 few months before the outbreak of the war, lays great emphasis upon the fact that Germany was compelled to build a strong fleet to protect her overseas commerce. "Ever since the end of the eighties in the nineteenth century", he says, '"'the building of a fleet sufficient to defend our overseas interests had been a vital question for the German nation." But the German fleet, nevertheless, was built with an eye upon the policy of Great Britain, and Prince Bilow, in common with other German poli-. ticians and authors, betrays the' fact that the protection of commerce was not the real raison d'étre of the German navy, but the desire to obtain such power at sea as would cause Great Britain to hesitate to quarrel openly with Germany if she gave offence by her aggressive policy' of expansion. Great Britain, however, was not intimated, but took up the just cause of the weak; the German High Seas Fleet elects to keep in the shelter of its fortified ports; and German overseas trade has ceased fo exist. If we return to Prince von Biilow's book we learn something of what this means to Germany woe of many of our countrymen.
If we had not in good time provided refection for these valuable and indispensable national possessions, we should have been exposed to the danger of having one day to look on defencelessly while we were deprived of them. But then we could not have return-the comfortable economic and political existence of a purely inland State. We should have been
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.