The matrimonial action of Brooke Brook, which was a petition by the wife for restitution of conjugal rights, was the subject of an interesting judgment given on Tues~ day in the Supreme Court by his Honour Judge Sir Skinner Tamer, Kespondent "alleged displays of violent temper anda confession of misconduct by his wife as grounds for refusing to live with her, but his Lordship found the first-grounds inadequate and the second not proved, and granted the petitioners prayer, Mr. Reader Harris appeared for petitioner and Mr. R. G. Mace Donald for respondent.
His Lordship said: This is a claim by a wife for a decree of restitution of conjugal rights: the husband claims that he had reason able cause for leaving her. It is clear that the burden of proof in Such a ease is on him, and Iam all satisfied that Twat calling. upon the petiio to begin. At all events, the ca of Smith Smith (1900, p. 66) ind Greene v. Greene (1916, p. 188). seem to show that it was for the respondent to begin, 'The respondent claims that he had reasonable cause for leaving his wife in that (1) she was possessed of a violent temper, (2) she had committed acts' of violence towards him, had locked him out of the house, had abused him and accused him of immorality, and (3) she had confessed to acts of adultery in Tsingtao in 1922, All this the petitioner denies, and there is no evidence before me ave that of the parties: oath against oath: and such additional matter as is contained in the correspondence, which really only shows that in 1923 the respondent termined not to cohabit wife any longer. It really would be enough to in this ease that the respondent, upon whom the whole burden of.proof ies, lih led to make out his case and therefore the decree must go. But I am not satisfied to do this: I want to ascertain the basis and the principles on which a decree of this nature ought to be granted or refused. The law is that up to 1884—Matrimonial Causes Act—47 and 48 Vict, Cap, 68, a respondent could only res petition of this nature by of a matrimonial offence on the part of the petitioner: ie, somes thing for which a decree of divorce or judicial separation could de granted, But that Act as interpreted" by the Courts Russell v, Russell (1805, p. 918) and Oldroyd v. Oldroyd (1896, p. 175), gave the Court some sort of discretion to refuse a decree for matters which do not amount to matrimonial offences. T have to ascertain what that' discretion is and how it is to be exercised,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.