The Archive · 1924

A Fortnight of Hostilities

Sept. 19.

Wir the sensational news received last night that the Chekiang General had gone over to the Fukien invader, that the two are momentarily expected in Hangchow and that Marshal Lu has left his capital for Lunghua (presumably) it is evident that the war may collapse speedily in East China, Everything depends on the attitude of General Hsia, the new civil governor of Hangchow, but if Sun Chuanfang gets into the Chekiang 1, it must be said that the chances of defending the western front look slender, even if Marshal Lu can continue to hold the eastern, and with it Lunghua and Woosung. Sun Chuan-fang is said frankly to desire the Tuchunship of Chekiang. S0 do others, very near to Marshal Chi of Kiangsu, If the carcase is not absolutely on the table, the eagles are already gathered together, presaging possibilities of further discord. What follows was written before the news of Marshal Lu's departure and may stand as merely a record of the general position.

At the end of the first two weeks of fighting—to be exact sixteen days since the first shots were exchanged—it may be of interest to try to sum up the general position and results, The latter, in a military sense, are practically nil. Much munition has been burned; some thousands of men killed and wounded—the casualties indeed have been far beyond what previous Chinese wars have shown; but little material change in the two armies' original position. Tt is extraordinary that this should be so, We are safe, we think, in assuming that Kiangsu outnumbers Chekiang and has the larger equipment, without counting that Marshal Chi has received reinforcements from the North and from up the Yangtze of 8,000 men at a moderate estimate. (In this we are taking only those troops that are testified to by foreigners). Since the fighting began it may well be that Chekiang have fought so well that Kiangsu could not get through; or that Marshal Chi is still waiting to accumulate such an overwhelming mass of men and guns that he may hope to win through to finish the war in a single battle, as Mr. Rodney Gilbert tells us today is the Kiangsu Marshal's design. But there remains always the great mystery why he did not strike sooner. He was in considerable force at Quinsan certainly some \days before Marshal Lu had got troops up the line to Huangtu. What was there to prevent Marshal Chi from marching straight through to Shanghai?

'The Kiangsu line on the eastern, that is the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, front runs practically north' and south, from Liuho on the Yangtze, through Kading, Anting (on the S..N. R.) to Tsinpa. The latter place is fifteen or twenty miles north of Sungkiang, Westwards, and about twenty-five miles north of Kashing, Kiangsu also hold Pingwang, to the southeast of the Taihu, What with hills and chains of lakes: we must suppose the country is: too difficult for any attempt by Kiangsu, from Tsinpu or Ping-wang, to get astride Marshal y's communications on the Shanghai-Hangchow line, But the vital importance of this railway. to \Chékiang and of the

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

Your account