The Archive · 1922

The Year of Disillusion

la ce Buchan, Vol. LI, (Nelson. or me Great War. By 25s, net.) ppeattes aXD AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING Cina. 1894-1914. Compiled and edited by John YA.

MacMurray. Two Volumes. (New York: Oxford University Press.

Japan ano THE Untrep Srazes"" by Pay son J. Treat. Houghton Mifflin Company.

The animation of Mr.

Buchan's narrative continues unabated through his second of his four volumes.

The period covered is from the inception of the Dardanelles campaign to the conclusion of the first stage of the Battle of Verdun. It embraces the whole story of Gallipoli: the Loos and Champagne attacks in the West; the staggering repulse of the Russians from the gates of Cracow to the further side of Warsaw; the entrance of Italy and Bulgaria into the war; the evisceration of Serbia and the 269

Mesopotamia fighting down to the fall of Kut.

There will be little dissent from the view that much of the ineffectiveness of our early efforts was due to "the absence of a competent General Staff at home,' that organization having been broken up at the commencement of the war to furnish commands in the field, with the result that Kitchener was left to add its work te his already too onerous responsibilities. Had it been otherwise, the enterprise of Gallipoli must surely have been placed in a truer light before those. who authorized it, and, if undertaken at all, provided with the timely resources that alone could have made it suecessful. Mr. Buchan's prepossessions, one can see, are for ''Westernism." But he admits that the policy of breaking through to Constantinople, while abstaining from premature offensive in France, would have shortened the whole war, adtucugh the claims that such a scheme would have been condemned as insane—and rightly condemned, on the facts before them—by every competent soldier in the spring of 1915." As'matters turned out, he recognizes that the capture of the peninsula would have been affected "had the necessary reserves been. provided in time'; that the vital success at Suvla was forfeited! mainly by "the inertness of old, tired, or sick commanders" and. "the bungling of ill-trained staffs" and that Sir Ian Hamilton's can-duct of '"'a task of superlative hardness" was free from any grave mistake.

Upon the supreme command in the West Mr. Buchan passes 2 more severe verdict. He takes due note of the general weakness of staff work, traceable to insufficient appreciation of "the thinking side of the Army," and the habit of giving men' Staff appointments "not because they were fitted for such duties, but because they were unfitted for others," to say nothing of the fact that there had been no practice in the handling of large masses of men. But his analysis of the battle of Loos culminates in a forcible criticism of Lord French's failure to group his reserves in support of his attacks, so that they were eight miles from the scene of action when needed for "ther Proper use of strengthening and. continuing the impetus of the first assault"

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the superb drive and devotion of the troops of attack were frittered away by a certain fumbling and confusion in the mind of Headquarters.

They anticipated some sort of success—ov, otherwise why was the cavalry massed in reserve?—but they had not considered fully the ways and means of" it. They took the Germans by surprise, but were themselves caught unawares. They succeeded better than:

they had hoped, and were not ready to use the gifts of fortune. Of. all the British actions in the war, Loos was the one which did least credit to the High Command.

The interaction between warfare and politics is succinctly noted by Mr. Buchan upon oceasign, and as it affected both sides.

Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.

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