Bubnov. Translated by Harold Williams. Gyldendal. 103 6d.
General Golovin was for many years professor of tactics at the Staff College im Petrograd. During the war he. was chief of Staff under Brusilov, and (after the war) under Kelchak. Subsequently, while living in Japan, he studied the various aspects of what is called the Pacific problem. Thus General Golovin writes with the authority of a distingmshed officer and a student of war. What is the problem of the Pacific? Its essence may be very simply stated. Japan is over-populated and must find more room for her people. She must extend her territories to the south or the west. "The question of the freedom of emigration," writes Golovin, "is pregnant with excuses for conflicts in the near future. It contains the inflammable material hich may blaze up from the slightest spark. The more: 'emote future is even more menacing. The longer Japan is prevented from sending out settlers to suitable countries, the stronger will the explosion The boiler is hound to explode sooner or later if internal pressure is not relieved and safety valves remain closed."" And Golovin concludes that "the only means of averting war with Japan in the twentieth century would be for the United States to evacuate the Philippines and to renounce her interests in Eastern Asia." The Russian considers that the expedient he describes is out of the question, and he proceeds to discuss tne strategical and tactical conditions of what he evidently regards as the inevitable conflict between the United States and Japan. According to Golovin, the probability is that America would get the worst of it. With scientific real he methodically sets forth the manufacturing resources of both sides, their nova! and military forces, and skilfully outlines the strategy and tactics of a tremendous campaign. But his book is not only a technical, disquisition; also a, valuable statement of political and economic con ditions, which no student of international affairs can afford to neglect.
General Golovin, moreover, dispassionately presents in lucid detail in what must consist the alternative te the peaceful concession to Japan of her economic and territorial requirements. It is not only a war. but a series of wars, in which the British Empire would be involved And Golovin predicts the eventual' combination of the East against the West. 2 7 The case of Japan, indeed. furnishes a vivid and an immediate example of a nation driven towards a war of conquest by the ineluctable pressure of economic needs. Political ambition, while it may direct and increase the pressure, in Idefault of it can do little Until the Great War, it was an axiom of statesmanship that under such conditions war was ultimately m-evitable. The Washington Conference was at least a definite attempt to prove that there is in tact a practicable alternative, consisting in friendly discussion and. a friendly arrangement.
General Golovin has no faith in the efficacy of the Washington Pact. It is true, as he observes, that the question of giving Japan what she wants, and what she must have, was not settled at that assembly. In the Russian's opinion, the maintenance of peace in the Pacific depends upon "the regeneration of China and Russia," thus restoring "the strategical balance of power in the Pacific." It may be sug: gested, however, that even if the balance of power ware thus restored, the result would not satisfy the needs of Japan. It would merely raise two more formidable obstacles in the way of their fulfilment.—''Morning Post."'
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.