Jan. 6.
On December 26 our Peking correspondent, after describing the ghastly disarray of affairs in Siberia due to the rout of Admiral Koltckak's army, urged strongly that the Allies must agree upon and enforce a decided line of action. His further report of January 2, (the date was accidentally dropped in yesterday's paper), certainly does nothing to ral that need less acute. Ada.
Koltchak's government, it is to be feared, is ''down and out.' His own personal integrity and fair-mindedness go for nothing as compared with the suspicion in which his entourage is held, especially now under the cloud of failure and lost prestige. The fact -of his appointing such a man as Ataman Simionov, who is held in general reprobation, to be governor-general of Transbaikalia is jin itself the worst possible confession of defeat. Meanwhile the western half of Irkutsk is held by men sympathetic with the Bolshevist. The river Angara Yreezes late owing to its strong current, but it ought to be crossable by now and the Reds, when they arrive, are not likely to pay any respect to the neutral zone which General Janin has managed to arrange with the Social Revolutionaries. The main preoccupation of the moment is how to extricate the enormous crowd of} Czechs, Poles, Rumanians, Serbs and the few British officers who still remain somewhere west of Trkutsk. The prospect of rescue ing them does not appear very much more hopeful than that of preventing the whole of Siberia, right down to the Pacific, from "becoming Bolshevist.
The difficulty which has attended every step in the progress of the Russian situation, of which Siberia is now but a part, has been the difficulty which ever hampers the action of Coalitions. Nothing can be done without -everybody being in agreement, and there is always an objector "who must be convinced, at the cost of much valuable time. Had it been possible to institute unity of command in respect of Russia as in the fight with Germany, the results would certainly be different to-day. Two months ago an effort was made to do the next "thing possible to establishing such unity of command, when it was decided that certain Powers were to make themselves responsible for helping the cause of ''White'' Russia. Great Britain was to concentrate on helping General Denikin in South Russia, while Siberia was to be left to the United States and Japan. The arrangement, however, has not proved a success. General Deni-kin appears to have failed militarily in spite of supplies from Great Britain, who was not meant to send bini troops. But this chapter is not yet fully written. In Siberia, the United States appears to have been unable to make up its mind what line to take. It has never shown much enthusiasm for Admiral Koltchak's administration; and as there was no question of making +{peace with the Bolsheviks, the result was what is eupheniistically cribed as marking time. The noble work done by the American Red Cross is not to be forgotten, nor the presence of some 7,000 American troops. But the impetus which sent them to Siberia does not appear to have survived in the State Denartment, which evidently finds it no easier than anyone else to decide and act upon a definite policy. Three weeks ago, we are informed by a Reuter message from London, Japan laid certain proposals before Washington, but owing to the absence of the Secretary of War no decision has yet been reached. Meanwhile, it is said, Japan is perfectly ready to send more troops to Siberia if her colleagues wish her to do so, There certainly appears no doubt that such a mandate should be given to Japan. To attempt to set Admiral Koltchak on his legs again is a hopeless undertaking. Nor, we imagine, would there be any question of a forward move to drive back the Bolsheviks from Irkutsk. But the country round Lake Baikal, with its chains of rugged hills, is well suited for defence, and it should be no matter of great difficulty for the Japanese to establish a barrier there or even further west, beyond which the Reds could not penetrate. Behind that barrier the true war on Bolshevism might then begin, not a war of bullets and bayonets, but an eronomie warfare. At least a part of the cause of the misfortunes of Koltchak, as no doubt also of Penikin and Yudenitch, has been the impossibility of getting the population within his control to fight, partly owing to ties of blood, still more because his rule offered no greater appearance of material prosperity than that of Bolshevism. One begins to suspect that it is here the Allies have made their greatest blunder. Fad they concentrated all their efforts on restoring normal conditions of life in the regions of Russia within their reach, on getting trade to move again, on promoting some flow of imports and exports and thereby stimulating industry and_reviving the value of Russian currency, an indirect blow would have been dealt at Bolshevism far more deadly than any army can achieve. Russia is Bolshevist because she sees nothing else to he. Were a different example shown her in those of her territories where the Reds do not command, their ascendancy would speedily begin to waver. Tt may yet be possible to save a portion of Eastern Siberia and through it to instil, in the manner described, some antidote to the naison of Rolshevism into the veins of the helpless giant.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.