Feb. 27.
Mr. Hu Han-min's speech at the weekly memorial service in Nanking, as reported by us ye terday, appears to leave no hope of war being avoided with General Yen Hsi-shan. The latter is compared by Mr. Hu to a double-edged sword; there is no' thought for the Party in the Northern leader who "only realizes that he is in contro! of some territory and military force and therefore would dictate to the Government as he pleases" and Mr, Hu goes on to twit General Yen with adroitly keeping always on the winning side, until "his success in utilizing his friendship with various parties through his machinations and political manipulations has led him to exaggerate his ability and importance." After language of this sort, and after General Chiang Kai-shek's telegrams February 19 and 22, which practically demanded unconditional submission on General Yen's part to Nanking's orders, there would seem to be only the one way of it. No fighting has occurred yet, but the Shanghai troops have' been moved to' Nanking and an Anhui corres: pondent reports to-day large movements of soldiers marching through the province. The outlook is bad.
Since the quarrel between General Yen Hsi-shan and Nai king broke openly with the for mier's telegram of February 13 denouncing the policy which led to nothing but "military comrades of the Kuomintang, all adherents of Sun Yat-sen, killing and wounding each other" Jand calling upon General Chiang to resign, there has been such a cross-fire of telegrams from all and sundry, that even Chinese readers have probably given up trying to follow them. The main charges, however, can be reduced to fairly simple terms.
General Yen protests Nanking's doctrine of unification by force; Nanking retorts that' General Yen is "feudalistic and militaristic." At some time in the dispute, General Yen appears. to have proposed the appointment of a Privy Council of Elder Statesmen, apparently all generals, "to preserve and protect! the Party and Government." We only get this referred to in a Nanking telegram to General Yen, so that we do not know what the latter actually said, but the inflammatory effect on the inking Kuomintang was proligious. The alignment of the: rival parties points to a serious combination against Nanking. Canton is true to the latter but is by no means free from danger from the Ironsides and Kuangsi forces, who are said to be waiting for news of hostilities in the North before striking again. On General Yen's side are Lu Chung-lin and Pei Chung-hsi, the Kuangsi generals of the old Wu-Han faction, and Sum Liang-chen and Han Fu-chu of the Kuominchun, whose scattered regiment they are said to be gathering, if they have not already gathered them, into a compact force.. Nanking appears to have a secure hold on the Yangtze Valley, which is of course One telegram fron Peking of February 18 deserves attention. It spoke of "a North-China secessionist movement which has long been brewing", although, it went on, it is considered likely that the North will wait for Nanking to strike the first blow. We shall, of course, be accused trying to sow dissension by magnifying rumours, But the paramount interest of the peace of China as a whole necessitates our saying frankly that we believe the telegram we have quoted is no idle gossip. Support has been given to it-in the past months by many pieces of intelligence which have reached us from different quarters; and the truth of it seems unavoidable from the breach that has now opened between General Yen and Nanking and the unmeasured language in which Nanking denounces him. Can Nanking really believe that it can conquer and subdue all the North? It seems inconceivable that it should attempt so colossal and hopeless a task. A few towns might be occupied, some battles won in the field. But Northern armies would only dissipated momentarily; their generals would not be captured or eliminated; and by-and-bye they would unite again with added grievance and bitterness Equally true does it appear that the North cannot conquer and subdue the South. Possibly it does not mean to try so long as it is not attacked. But merely to stand on- the defensive on either side is no cure. So that the only alternatives with which China seems to be faced more wasting and futile warfare, or a stalemate to prolong distrust and uneasiness and to block national reorganization.
Can no better way be found? Is there no space for quiet thinking and conciliatory and gesture? It must plainly that this incessant quarrelling begins to make a bad impression abroad. Onlookers in other countries cannot be pected to appreciate nice distinctions of rival responsibility. It only appears to them that China is an extraordinarily quarrelsome country, and they are prone to conclude that a Government which is forced to maintain itself by perpetual fighting must only be regarded as one faction among many, The general impression thus formed must tell inevitably against China's interests and wishes in all international dealings. From one point of view we can appreciate the arguments that are advanced for unification by force, But the unanswerable fact of the situation is that that method has been tried again and again for eighteen years and always it has failed, as we cannot but believe it always will. Meanwhile the Nationalist dreams of reorganization and prosperity come to naught. At the risk of appearing to interfere in matters which do not concern us, though indeed no one can live-in China and remain unconcerned in her welfare, we would venture one plain saying. If the North really wishes to secede, let it do so. A line could be Grawn parallel and to the north of the Yangtze, which could easily be defended against incursion, although we do not believe any such attempt would: occur on a major scale; and southwards of that line all efforts "could be concentrated on restoring order and finance. 'The' secession would not last long. In a very short time all parts of China would be draw: automatically into the-orbit of the prosperous regions which.had been.created. papers say. "Dog doesn't eat dog" isa good maxim journalism, and while every cannot hold the same opinions, we wish to respect the views of other papers' as we should wish them to respect ours, But articles occasionally appear on matters of special public interest which must be answered, In one of our foreign morning contemporaries yesterday there was a defence of the Provisional Court agreement and the manner in which it was negotiated which is probably the. only one available, and a remarkably dangerous one at that. If this had been all, however, there might have been. no more to be said. But the article excites strong stispicion of having been inspired from a certain quarter in the Council's administration.
If this is not so we apologize to that quarter and to our conte porary. It remains that the article indicates a policy which, if what has happened in one instance, is to be a precedent for others, ratepayers must protest against with might and main, Our contemporary puts forward the argument that, if the conference at Nanking on the Provisional Court had resulted unfavourably for the Chinese, the jonalist_ Government could, and possibly would, have denotinced the Land Regulation: thereby rendering inoperative the whole municipal government of the International Settlement, that, therefore, it was the duty of the persons allegedly representing foreign interests as a whole, and those of the Settl ment in part, to make the best terms possible with the Nanking Government; and that, consequently, the solution eventually arrived at, with all its imperfec~ tions, was the only one obtain able. If our diplomatic presentatives were really actu ed by any such considerate the sooner we abandon all pre~ tence of negotiation and defen of legal rights the better. course, China might repudiate the Land Regulations. But she seriously thought of doing such a thing—which we no more believe she does think of than we believe that the Powers would "wipe out Shanghai with a stroke of the pen" because the Council insisted on recognition of their rights and responsibilities—she would not be deterred by the surrender of obviously necessary safeguards in cerine tion with the Provisional Court.
This paper has often been accused of taking a low view of China's official actions. But really it seems to us we have never said anything so insulting '4s is implied by the defeatists in this bogey they have invented for their own intimidation.
Let us make it quite plain that we are in no songo quarrelling with the Chinese for getting all they can. Nothing is more natural on their part and nobody complains of it, But equally we are sure that they will not quar rel with us for defending all we may. and in recent years de-Featism has let slip much that could have been preserved. For example, the Land Regulations certainly appear to give the Council the right to buy land outside the Settlement for making roads, and the custom of many years supports them. The debateable clause is a matter for negotiation and the Chinese officials have never been able to be brought to. negotiate it, they have merely denied the Council's claims and the practice of der cades; and on the foreign side the situation has been tamely accepted. It is the laxity of our defence against insidious whift,
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.