Before the war with China I hi closely examined the military! organization of that country, and had discovered that there were some 50,000 men under Li Hung-chang who were reported to be very well cauipped and trained by German officers. Besiles this organized army there were supposed to lie between 200,000 and 1,000,000 troops China. Of these, however, only those inthe northern provinces were available for action against our} armies, about 30,000 men. I therefore ever contemplated that, in case of any emergency leading' to war with China, it should be so arranged that 50,000 men of the Japanese army should be devoted to meet the army of Li Hung-chang, while the other 150.000 could deal with the 300,000 untrained treens available in Pechihli and the other northern provinces.
discovered also a great weakners in the army of Li Hung-chang. and one which I could appreciate from its resemblance to a weakness which had been encountered at the time of the Restoration in the Imperial army of Japan, which consisted of the feudal retainers under different feudal lords. This weakness was that Li Hung-chang, besides drawing a considerable portion of his soldiers from his own native place, also obtained his officers there. Thus, when anything happened te an officer in his army, he could not be replaced from amongst the troops under the command. of the other generals. Thus it was necessary to send to Li Hung-chang's native Province for all new officers. custom which was universal throughout the whole army, and which made a great difference between the reported strength and the actual Strength in the field. The Chinese army was divided into yes, or battalions, which were suppered to. consist of 500 1aen. In reality, how. ever, they rarely ever consisted. more than 300 or 350 men. Tie. commander of the yee, or camp, was in this way enabled to pocket the pay of 200 or 150 of his soldiers} from the Government grants. Even as late as the Boxer disturbances, when the Allied Forces were in North China, this state of corruption in the Chinese army did not seem an important difference between the paper and actual strength of the Chinese forces. It was owing to the accurate knowledge which I had obtained as to the condition of affairs in North China that it was possible so to lay the plans of campaign as surely and safely bring about the complete victory of 'Now, had China paid the slightest attention to Prince Yamagata's criticism, it might to-day not_ subject to military feudalism. But} China did not think it worth' whil: to pay any attention to Prince! Yamagata, It is doubtful whether: the Manchu rulers ever read the article. It is almost certain that none of the present war lords ever saw it, Mere was the man who defeated China in a war, telling the world that before his nation entered, upon that, enterprise he came to China, studied the Chinese army and) found' the thing rotten and corvapt and useless, that he thought that he pitted an equal number against tne best troops China possessed, any only half as many Against the rest of her army, he would be victorious. In this article, he really indicates why and how Japan defeated China and how China can reorganize herself to become an equal among nations. Mr. Chu would probably suggest that ti League of Nations should suppress the article and had Mr. Lo been writing when Prince Yamagata wrote, he would have suggested that the Prince should be driven from the land. Yet both Mr. Cha and Mr. Lo might still take advantags of "Prince Yamagata's suggestion and might attack the system of military feudalism which is ruining their country.
Text read from the printed page and cleaned; old type leaves the occasional error.